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 This portfolio explores a symbiotic relationship underlying much of the terrorist 
decision making process from an organizational perspective. That being, three facets of 
the decision making process that are dependent upon each other in terms of influence and 
operational implications. The three essential considerations that are taken into account are 
strategic, organizational and psychological. Specifically, the chapters in this portfolio 
examine the role of these considerations in the terrorist decision making process by 
examining specific tactics and strategies adopted by various terrorist organizations 
around the world.  
 By examining the role of external support on the existence of terrorist 
organizations, the first chapter attempts to identify and argue that three distinct factors 
must be associated within terrorist groups, all of which embody an organizational 
consideration for achieving longevity. First, a terrorist group must operate under a veil of 
legitimacy. Second, the organization must have popular support from the host nation. 
Lastly, the organization must have financial contribution to the terrorist lifecycle. It 
concludes that without all of these three common factors a terrorist organization is likely 
to experience brevity and thus appear trivial to their cause. The second chapter looks at a 
strategic consideration by identifying the organizational perspective of the decision 
making process. It does so by examining, how do motivations influence the decision for 
terrorist organizations to employ suicide terrorism as their modus operandi? It seeks to 
find an explicit answer(s), but the results offer a case by case consideration of context 
within each organization’s decision to employ suicide terrorism. Finally, the third chapter 
looks at the psychological consideration by examining the ways in which a terrorist 
iii 
 
organization can manipulate military intervention to spread terrorism. It concludes by 
offering the need for a concentrated effort of specific regional considerations including 
religious beliefs, social and cultural traditions by intervening forces. These considerations 
negate the opportunity of terrorist organizations to utilize psychological warfare through 
their means of manipulation.  
 This portfolio concludes that by addressing specific strategies and tactics of 
terrorist organizations we can explain the three most profound considerations within the 
discussion of the terrorist decision making process, that being: the strategic 
considerations, the organizational considerations and the psychological considerations. 
This offers a concentrated counterterrorism effort that is restricted, yet effective to 
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Through an examination of existing literature and general public opinion, the 
beliefs that Islamic fundamentalism and lunacy explain the terrorist decision making 
process are erroneous.  As this study will argue, the terrorist decision making process is a 
methodical process that can provide officials with valuable insight for counterterrorism 
strategies, however increased research on the topic is needed. A study on decision 
making from the perspective of terrorist organizations allows for dynamism to the general 
study of terrorism which today focuses heavily on the perspective of counterterrorism 
forces. Effectiveness in the latter necessitates a thorough understanding of the former. 
The three following chapters of this portfolio will focus on the interplay of three 
fundamental factors involved in the terrorist decision making process; the organizational, 
strategic and psychological considerations. The interplay of these three factors are 
important, not just the factors themselves.  This systematic study of terrorism offers a 
modern approach to research in the field, on a subject that is contentious and extensive in 
its history.  
The terrorist decision making process can be divided among three distinct levels 
of consideration which can be explained through the analysis of specific tactics and 
strategies of terrorist organizations.
1
 These three considerations are most important 
because understanding the interplay of each enables counterterrorism officials the 
opportunity to view the decision making process as a system of related entities; a process 
that is often viewed by scholars as factors that are mutually exclusive. First, the 
organizational consideration will be concerned with the sources by which resources can 
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be utilized to provide for an organizations existence via direct operational support and 
broad support activities.
2
 Second, the strategic consideration will be concerned with the 
decision to employ specific tactics as an instrumental choice made by a rational 
organization attempting to achieve a specific goal.
3
 Lastly, the psychological 
consideration will be concerned with the organizational decision to employ psychological 
tactics and strategies aimed at directly influencing or manipulating a targeted audience.
4
  
Each chapter represents one of the fundamental considerations in terms of the 
terrorist decision making process; that being, organizational considerations, strategic 
considerations and psychological considerations. These three considerations are often 
viewed as mutually exclusive in the study of terrorism, but as this study will show, the 
relationship between the three often overlaps and necessitates being viewed as symbiotic. 
Doing so will provide a framework for viewing counterterrorism efforts in terms of 
attainable goals and by avoiding long protracted conflicts. It is a unique approach to 
viewing the terrorist decision making process from literature that exists today. It involves 
a multipronged examination of the process by looking at the three 
 most researched considerations under one focused study as opposed to three mutually 
exclusive studies. 
 Chapter 1 of this portfolio will address organizational considerations by looking 
at the affects of external support on the existence of terrorist organizations. External 
support is essentially the lifeline of a terrorist organization. It enables and facilitates their 
existence in a multitude of ways through both direct operational means and broader 
support activities. This chapter will argue that there are three common factors of external 
                                                          
2
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4
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support that most contribute to the existence of a terrorist organization. First, external 
support allows an organization to operate under a veil of legitimacy that not only operates 
without oversight, but severely challenges counterterrorism efforts. Secondly, external 
support increases popular support regionally and in the host nation by allowing the 
organization to fulfill its agenda politically and socially. Lastly, external support allows a 
terrorist organization to become a formidable threat by contributing to a terrorist life 
cycle, essentially enabling direct operational activities. The hypothesis in this chapter 
focuses on terrorist organizations needing all three common factors of external support to 
sustain longevity in their existence. It is believed that in the event one of these 
considerations are not met, the existence of the terrorist organization will be heavily 
challenged. An extensive network essentially enables a terrorist organization to 
formidably oppose a more superior opposition. 
 Chapter 2 of this portfolio will address the strategic consideration of this portfolio 
by looking at how motivations influence the decision for terrorist organizations to utilize 
suicide terrorism as their modus operandi. Suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon, 
however the frequency of these attacks necessitates an evaluation. It has acted as an 
equalizer within irregular warfare between much more globalized and technologically 
advanced forces. The relationship between religious fanaticism and suicide terrorism 
inundates scholarly literature today, however this study will seek to show that there is 
logic and strategic calculation behind terrorist organizations’ decision to employ suicide 
terrorism. It is strategic in that it is low in cost. It remains a more effective alternative to 
other forms of terrorism. Suicide terrorist are difficult to identify and track as a result of 
their as a result of the characteristics embodied within the individual and group dynamic. 
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Religious leaders are able to justify this modus operandi in terms of ideological 
justifications. Summarily suicide terrorism has operational advantages that far outweigh 
alternative means of action.  
 Chapter 3 of this portfolio will address the psychological considerations by 
looking at how terrorist organizations utilize military interventions to spread their cause. 
It will show that terrorist organizations manipulate essential regional factors such as 
religious beliefs, social and cultural traditions. They use these factors to gain support and 
sympathy by activating nationalist reactions.  This chapter shows overlap between 
organizational, strategic and psychological considerations yet its focus is on the efforts of 
terrorist organizations’ manipulation capabilities through psychological warfare. They do 
so by manipulating the relationship between intervening forces and the spiritual identity 
of the host nation; as well as by exaggerating a disconnect of social and cultural traditions 
between an intervening force and the host nation. This chapter will argue that to be 
successful military intervention must be sensitive to these three regional conditions 
because when one is breached terrorist organizations will exploit the intentions of an 
intervening force as self-indulged.  
The prevalence of terrorism today and the egregious acceptance that it is a 
phenomenon in our lives is a concept that inspired this study. Moreover, literature on this 
topic is inundated with a counterterrorism operational approach and the efforts necessary 
to defeat terrorism. Assimilating a study into the perspective of terrorist organizations 
enables this portfolio to manifest predictable, achievable and calculable strategies that are 
independent from religious explanative jargon. Globalization has stratified the theatre of 
warfare dramatically by increasingly enabling irregular warfare. War between states is far 
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less likely than war between states and organizations today, thus increased focus on 
terrorist organizations is needed. Terrorism is dominated by organizational labels such as 
al Qaeda, Hezbollah, al Shabaab and the Tamil Tigers to name a few. These labels 
represent more than a name of the organization, they represent ideology, terror, violence, 
religion and even politics, yet often times these representations cloud our understandings 
that are needed to defeat these organizations. Disassembling terrorist strategies by 
evaluating the decision making process from an organizational perspective simplifies 



































External Support of Terrorist Organizations 
 
 
Terrorist organizations exist for a multitude of reasons. External support is the 
mechanism that enables and facilitates their existence regardless of differing agendas or 
geo-political implications among terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations on a 
global scale necessitate external support not only as a lifeline, but also as a means of 
fulfilling their ideological goals, recruitment, support, planning and execution of their 
agendas. External support is an alarming component to the study of terrorist 
organizations because it materializes and legitimizes terrorist organizations claims’. 
External support comes in various forms; financially, logistically, ideologically and 
through recruitment to name a few. The literature presented in the review will explore the 
breadth of literature on external support which focuses on funding operations. This 
chapter as a result will be concerned with addressing the void in academic literature by 
addressing how external support affects the existence of terrorist organizations beyond 
funding operations. That is, resources beyond funding that enable an organization to 
survive. A veil of legitimacy, popular support and financial support reinforce each other 
and contribute to a group’s long term survival.  Moreover, its role as an organizational 
consideration in the terrorist decision making process will convey a symbiotic 
relationship with the two following chapters which evaluate a strategic and psychological 
consideration respectively. Popular literature focuses on terrorist group’s operational 
reasoning, whether motivated by political or an ideological agenda, however 
understanding how external support affects the existence of terrorist organizations 





 Organizations necessitate external support to create and maintain 
organizational support, to sustain an ideology of terrorism through propaganda 
mechanisms and to finance the presumably legitimate activities needed to provide a veil 
of legitimacy for terrorist organizations.
6
 
This chapter will seek to argue that there are three common effects of external 
support that most contribute to the existence of terrorist organizations. First, the 
ambiguity and complexity of external support due to the veil of legitimacy makes 
counterterrorism efforts increasingly challenging. Financial contributions aid in weapons, 
ammo, explosives and even wages for its fighters. Propaganda is fueled through 
ideological and financial support aimed at recruitment and retention of fighters. The 
ambiguity of financial support networks which operate under covert and overt covers 
create a significant challenge to counterterrorist efforts. All of the above is procured 
through tactics that utilize a veil of legitimacy that makes identification of sources, 
individuals and intentions difficult. Second, external support causes an increase in 
popular support within a country harboring a specific terrorist organization. External 
support enables an organization to fulfill its ideological platform that was presented to 
society within the host nation. Consequently, fulfillment of their promises increases 
moral, physical and political support within a country.  Lastly, external support enables a 
terrorist organization to become a formidable threat to its enemies by contributing to each 
component of a terrorist life cycle.
7
 This is inclusive of communication, logistics, 
                                                          
5
 Hamilton, Lee. ―Terrorist Organizational Models‖. A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First 
Century. August 15, 2007.  
6
 Force, Financial Action Task. "Terrorist financing." Financial Action Task Force (2008). 
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recruitment, salaries, training, travel, safe havens, bribes and weapons acquisition.
8
 
Within such considerations, external support allows an organization to project its power 
on a global scale. The restriction of borders and limitations are overcome when external 
support is strong and transnational reach is possible. Essentially, external support has 
consequences for terrorist organizations beyond funding operations.  This chapter will 
explore the hypothesis that terrorist organizations need all three common factors 
previously mentioned to sustain longevity within their existence while maintaining an 
extensive network of direct operational support and broader support activities. Their 
threat to the global community will be comprehensive, thus creating significant 
challenges to counterterrorism efforts that could more readily counter a less extensive and 
weaker supported organization. Global networks like al Qaeda and Hezbollah are 
formidable threats that maintain an extensive presence in the world as a result of their 
resourcefulness. Conversely, smaller affiliates who suffer from the absence of a strong 
external support network remain severely challenged in terms of resource attrition and 
against counterterrorism efforts. As a result, such organizations’ existence appears trivial.  
 
Defining the Concepts 
 In order to understand the breadth of this study it is important to clarify some key 
concepts, namely what is meant by the term external support and what qualifies a terrorist 
organization. For purposes of this study, I will draw on a Rand study titled ―Assessing 
The Impact of External Support‖.
9
 This study draws on trends in outside support for 
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9
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insurgent movements, but meets several criteria for understanding the role of external 
support for terrorist organizations. Those being, factors that explain how terrorist 
organizations exist by looking at what external support does for an organization. These 
similarities which qualify the utilization of the Rand study in my argument for terrorist 
organizations will be drawn from a study by Peter Neumann and Michael Smith based on 
terrorism as a strategic choice that follows a three-stage method: disorientation, target 
response and gaining legitimacy.
10
 These distinguish similarities between the goals of an 
insurgent and the goals of a terrorist. An insurgency and a terrorist organization employ 
violent methods, not as a direct means to compel, but as a method of ideological 
communication.
11
 Both struggle to gain legitimacy for their ideas in the minds of the 
target audience.
12
 Lastly, both groups seek to detract from the legitimacy of a non-
compliant government.
13
 Terrorism is essentially a strategy for an insurgency; it 
nonetheless meets the requirements for external support of an organization. There are 
varying viewpoints of what a terrorist organization is, based on modern academic 
literature. Some academics provide definitions that span dense paragraphs referencing 
many traits that qualify their definition.
14
 Others offer a minimalist definition that is 
narrow and concise.
15
 For this study I will use a definition that is comprehensive among a 
breadth of literature on the topic and define terrorist organizations as politically 
motivated groups which utilize their tactics involving threats, the use of force or violence, 
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by which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role for goals specific to the 
organization.
16
 This definition is useful throughout this chapter and the remainder of the 
portfolio.  
 The use of the term legitimacy throughout this portfolio is meant as a value 
whereby something or someone, including a group, is recognized as credible and even 
lawful.
17
 This definition is drawn from the principles of Max Weber and adapted to meet 
the arguments represented throughout this portfolio. This form of legitimacy can be used 
in my arguments because the use of this term is intended only in regards to the activities 
carried about by terrorist organizations. At no point throughout this portfolio, will I make 
arguments for or against the political legitimacy of a terrorist organization and their 
desire to be the state. For purposes of my argument, legitimacy will be used in terms of 
the terrorist decision making process and the establishment of credibility to justify their 
need for popular support, inevitably contributing to a group’s long term survival. 
Each terrorist organization is unique, meaning various forms of support are 
intended to meet a variety of needs. External support of terrorist organizations may seek 
to enable them to survive counterterrorism efforts, challenge a host government or even 
weather a decrease in popular support.
18
 Defining external support can be accomplished 
by comprehensively grouping its meanings in two categories: human and material.
19
 
These two categories represent critical, valuable and minor forms of support.
20
  Thus, 
defining external support in terms of these two categories allows for an understanding of 
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 Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. "The challenges of conceptualizing 
terrorism." Terrorism and Policical Violence 16, no. 4 (2004): 777-794. 
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the pervasive nature of external support and its impact on the existence of terrorist 
organizations. Human necessities that define external support are: training, mobilization 
of political support and propaganda, fighters including effective leadership for control 
and command, intelligence concerning the adversary, inspiration and organizational aid.
21
 
Material necessities that define external support are: safe havens and transits, financial 
resources, direct military support, weapons and sensible materials including food, fuel 
and day-to-day human necessities.
22
 Summarily, these facets define what is meant by 
external support in terms of its reference to this study. This definition is intended to be 
broad to encompass a general understanding of the extensiveness of organizational 
considerations. External support is necessary as a general concept in the general study of 
terrorism and groups specifically.  
 
Literature Review 
 The breadth of literature conducted on this topic reveals a compelling lack of 
information regarding the question, what does external support do for terrorist 
organizations? Rather, there is significant information on the logistics of external support, 
meaning how support is garnered, where external support is delegated and why external 
support is provided to organizations. Also, the literature demonstrates a fundamental 
weakness as a result of the brevity exhibited. Exploring the effects of external supports 
necessitates further elaboration of surface knowledge. In most cases the literature 
presented offers surface knowledge such as monetary support is used for the purchase 
and procurement of arms, explosives and ammo. By elaborating on information of this 
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caliber this chapter is able to contribute to the surface knowledge by providing dynamism 
and depth to the topic. In addition the literature review for this topic will provide context 
to the two remaining chapters which are more focused on specific tactics and strategies 
that are taken into account in the decision making process by terrorist organizations. 
There is however, significant information regarding how financial support effects 
terrorist organizations provided by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The study 
conducted by this group offers a comprehensive analysis of the literature that exists 
regarding external support of terrorist organizations. This research project was initiated to 
provide a contemporary snapshot of the ways in which terrorist organizations raise, move 
and use external support.
23
 It draws on a myriad of scholarly articles, studies, secondary 
resources and various government and non-governmental organizations to draw its 
conclusions. The focus of this literature review draws on this study because profit, not 
ideology, often drives terrorist organizations.
24
 This profit is regarded in terms of 
monetary gains as well as the gains in operational resources like weapons, safe havens, 
recruits and other support mechanisms. This information is relevant to the topic at hand 
and speaks to the breadth of literature that is currently focused on external support of 
terrorist organizations because it addresses the only prevalent analysis of the use of 
external support in terms of financial considerations. This paper will contribute to the 
FATF because it will add considerations outside the financial concern for uses of external 
support. Studying how training, weapons and material procurement, propaganda and 
political support are used provides depth to a topic that comprehensively is viewed in a 
singular dimension.  
                                                          
23
 Force, Financial Action Task. "Terrorist financing." Financial Action Task Force (2008), 5. 
24
 Martuscello, Michael. "The FATF’s Nine Special Recommendations: A Too ―Soft‖ Approach to 
Combating Terrorism?." Touro International Law Review 14, no. 2 (2011): 368. 
13 
 
The Use of External Support: A Financial Consideration 
 The first step in exploring how terrorist organizations use their external support 
necessitates a thorough understanding of the requirements of each organization 
respectively.
25
 Resource allocation is not only needed for the execution of attacks, but 
also for maintaining an organization’s structure, ideology and support base. Financial 
contributions are inevitably the most significant form of external support to an 
organization. They provide for the operational execution phases as well as the financial 
obligations of sustaining an organization. Funds are used to promote ideology, pay wages 
to militants and/or their families, logistics, training and weapons acquisition to name a 
few.
26
 The financial support aspect of external support is necessary not only to support 
terror operations, but also to meet broader organizational goals of developing and 




 Terrorist financing requirements reflects the diversity between organizations.
28
 
Terrorist organizations vary significantly, from large organizations like al Qaeda and ISIS 
to small decentralized networks like al Qaeda affiliates al Nusra Front and Ansar al 
Islam.
29
 Existing literature on the use of external support focuses on direct operational 
requirements. That is, requirements that are needed to be funded for the effort of carrying 
out terrorist attacks. Monetary support gained by terrorist organizations causes harm to 
their targets, host nations and the West in a myriad of ways. Funds received through 
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 United Nations (2001), UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) [Threats to international peace and 
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external support allow terrorist groups the opportunity to purchase arms, ammunitions 
and explosives to be used against their enemies.
30
 The resources required for direct 
operational support vary based on the precursor materials necessary for an attack, such as 
vehicles, improvised bomb-making components, maps, surveillance material etc.
31
 
Financial support is needed to pay salaries to militants for day to day expenses including 
communication resources.
32
 Financing training, travel and logistics are not only 
fundamental to the operational aspect, but also the psychological aspect of ideological 
indoctrination.
33
The direct cost of carrying out individual attacks remains relatively low 
in comparison to the cost of the damage inflicted by the attack.
34
 This damage is costly in 
terms of short term implications following the attack, as well as long term effects on 
counterterrorism efforts. This literature is significant to the premise of this study because 
it speaks to the challenges of counterterrorism efforts. Financing as a general 
consideration insinuates the notion of longevity. The uses of terrorist financing as 
described in this literature contribute not only to the longevity of a terrorist organization, 
but also to its threat assessment. The three factors combined in the premise of this study 
are all relevant in terms of the financial considerations presented. Financing provides 
tactical support capable of defending and attacking against counterterrorist forces. 
Financial contributions to the life cycle of a terrorist not only sustain an operational cell, 
but inevitably create a formidable threat to a terrorist organizations’ enemy. Furthermore, 
                                                          
30
 Billingslea, William. "Illicit cigarette trafficking and the funding of terrorism." Police Chief 71, no. 2 
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31
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financial contributions tend to cause in increase in indigenous support of host nations as 
will be discussed further in this review.  
Providing for the existence of a terrorist organization also includes financing for 
broader support activities. That is, maintaining a terrorist network or operational cell, 
supporting infrastructure, providing for recruitment, promoting ideology, planning, and 
procurement between attacks, all of which conceptualize the importance of terrorism 
financing.
35
 Maintaining the broader support activities of an organization is required to 
sustain a global network and promote an organization’s agenda.  
Terrorist organizations often utilize complicit charities and businesses to support 
their activities.
36
 These groups manipulate charities as a source of funding for terrorist 
attacks and terrorist recruitment by providing a veil of legitimacy over an organization 
based on terrorism.
37
 The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is representative of the effects of 
external support. Between 1998 and 1991, ASG reaped the benefits of external support 
through funds sent from al Qaeda for purposes of recruitment, organization and 
operational assistance.
38
 Its leader, Ustadz Janjalani befriended Osama Bin Laden who 
liked his ideology and subsequently funded his organization.
39
 For the most past ASG’s 
funding was funneled through the global charity Islamic International Relief Organization 
(IIRO) which was conveniently founded by Osama Bin Laden’s brother in law Jamal 
Khalifa. This charity provided the perfect veil of legitimacy for ASG operating in the 
Philippines. It provided construction of an orphanage, pharmacy dispensaries, floating 
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clinics, food and clothing to displaced people who fled war zones, schools and 
scholarships.
40
 The Philippine National Security Advisor summed up this veil by 
claiming, ―Khalifa built of the good will of the community through charity and then 
turned segments of the population into agents.‖
41
 External support in this magnitude 
alludes to the second factor mentioned in this argument in that it increases popular 
support within the host nation. The legitimate functions of organizations like charities 
and nonprofits are utilized by terrorist organizations to illicit an ideological fulfillment of 
their platforms as an alternative to Western influence and host governments.  
The ways in which terrorist organizations are funded are essential to this study, 
but only represents a singular dimension to the study of how external support affects 
terrorist organizations. The broad spectrum of financial considerations explored above 
highlight the distinction between financial functions of operational support and the 
financial uses of broader support activities. The literature on these two general areas 
drawn from the study on terrorist financing by the Financial Action Task Force 
comprehensively addresses the effects of external support on the existence of terrorist 
organization through a focus on financial considerations. A vulnerability of this subject 
matter is the lack of depth in the literature which focuses on the uses of finances. Rather, 
the literature demonstrates a consensus that there is an increased focus on the logistics of 
financial support, that being, ways in which terrorist organizations raise funds and obtain 
support and how they move funds or support. What the literature fails to do is offer 
literature that is beyond surface consumption of what financial support is used for which 
comprehensively refers to the notion that finances are used to fund direct operational 
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requirements such as attacks. Detailing these uses enables a thorough counterterrorism 
effort of fragmenting extensive financial support systems that significantly contributes to 
the longevity of a terrorist organization. 
Obtaining External Support 
 The literature shows a principal interest in how organizations raise and obtain 
external support, but also clearly shows overlap between how funds are used through 
legitimate sources, as mentioned in the previous section and how legitimate sources are 
used to raise and sustain external support. Creating the veil of legitimacy allows an 
organization to legally obtain external support resources around global restrictions and 
sanctions which seek to prevent this very activity. Obtaining external support is inclusive 
of raising funds which occur through state sponsorship, self-financing and propaganda 
which seeks to garner ideological support for their actions.
42
 Obtaining external support 
occurs in a myriad of ways across a quantitative spectrum ranging from large scale 
support mechanisms like state sponsorship, global financial networks, and global 
organizational networks like al Qaeda and its small affiliates, to small scale support like 
self-financing, local support and criminal activity. 
43
 
 The extensive sources of external support garnered by terrorist organizations 
primarily derive from legitimate sources that sympathize with terrorist groups, are 
manipulated by their narrative, or seek objectives through a proxy group. ―Black-
washing‖ is a significant concept worth consideration in this very topic.
44
 It is the 
mechanism where legal funds such as those stemming from charities, governmental 
                                                          
42
 Ibid, Force, 11.  
43
 Ibid, Force, 11.  
44
 Martuscello, Michael. "The FATF’s Nine Special Recommendations: A Too ―Soft‖ Approach to 
Combating Terrorism?." Touro International Law Review 14, no. 2 (2011): 371.  
18 
 
subsidies and social benefits are diverted to terrorist organizations for efforts of 
radicalization, recruitment or acts of terror.
45
  
By nature terrorist organizations often seek to capitalize on vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses of societies, regions, organizations and states. They do so to create a safe 
haven for their organizations and to facilitate their operations, ideologies and sustainment 
of their existence. In consideration of the latter, charities and non-profit organizations 
possess characteristics that make them extremely attractive to terrorist organizations that 
can capitalize on their vulnerabilities and weakness in an effort to raise and obtain 
external support.
46
 The Financial Action Task Force found that terrorist groups take 
advantage of charities and non-profit organizations’ public trust, their cash-intensive 
operations and more importantly their considerable sources of support.
47
 Capitalizing on 
these organizations enable terrorist organizations to delve past existential vulnerabilities 
of the principal groups they wish to take advantage of and likewise do so to the support 
systems of those groups. Terrorist organizations successfully obtain external support and 
raise funds for operations by operating behind a veil of legitimacy via these groups. The 
Financial Action Task Force concludes that misusing charities and non-profits for 
obtaining support is recognized as a critical vulnerability in the global counterterrorism 
effort to eliminate external support.
48
 
Legitimate businesses represent a facet of how terrorist organizations obtain 
external support.
49
 The literature shows a significant overlap of mechanisms by which 
terrorist groups utilize businesses to raise capital and obtain resources for operation, 
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similar to their manipulation of charities. The literature shows that legitimate businesses 
are often monitored by banks in terms of the flow of funds and financial transactions. As 
a result, in the event that the flow of funds is disproportionate to normal business activity 
of a company, suspicion of black washing is likely.
50
 Nevertheless, legitimate businesses 
are one of the many sources utilized by terrorist organizations for obtaining external 
support. Businesses that do not require substantial investments are able to operate around 
financial regulations within the market that would ordinarily be flagged in the event of 
irregular monetary activity.
51
 For example, in cases where sales reported and actual sales 
are difficult to verify, legitimate businesses are able to act as a proxy to terrorist 
organizations.
52
 As a result, terrorist organizations are highly concerned with preventing 
the legitimate origin of funds from being discovered to ensure that their benefactors 
escape punishment and can continue funding terrorist activity.
53
 
Obtaining external support through criminal activity remains an attractive option 
for terrorist organizations, particularly for nascent groups, decentralized and independent 
cells which struggle to obtain access to foreign support.
54
 Procurement of direct 
operational support and increased funding often comes as a result of criminal activity 
such as arms trafficking , kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, drug trafficking, and racketeering 
to name a few. 
55
 Increased international pressure on state sponsorship of terrorism has 
compelled organizations to rely heavily on criminal activity to obtain support resources.
56
 
The literature available inherently suggests that with the fragility of reliance on large 
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scale support networks like businesses and state sponsors, small scale operations such as 
criminal activity remain an attractive alternative. Terrorists have been known to engage 
in narcotics, credit card fraud, check fraud and extortion.
57
 Moreover, capitalizing on 
expatriate or diaspora communities globally decentralizes their external support system 
by adding variety to their sources. Extorting diaspora or expatriate communities enables 
consistency to support systems by eliciting fear of retribution to relatives in the country 
of origin.
58
 Criminal activity is a secure method of obtaining external support. It mitigates 
a paper trail, it is inexpensive, it remains consistent and it even negates a quid pro quo 
relationship with external networks.  
In the event that obtaining and raising external support is high, terrorist 
organizations are able to sustain their operations over a course of time, while enjoying the 
benefit of increasing their support network as a result. Adding to their pervasiveness 
attests to the three factors evaluated in this study. A larger network is increasingly more 
difficult to counter. Popular support as a result of the veil of legitimacy increases 
indigenous support by fulfilling legitimate services. Lastly, the persistence of obtaining 
and raising support significantly contributes to the legitimacy of a terror threat by 
sustaining the lifecycle of a terrorist. Despite these considerations, the literature presented 
in this section is weakened by the absence of how those support resources and sources are 
used. Are specific sources used for specific means? Similarly, how are the funds that are 
raised being used in consideration of the direct operational necessities and the broad 
support requirements previously mentioned? Literature on these subjects will provide 
depth to a topic inundated with surface knowledge. The literature on how terrorist 
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organizations raise and obtain support can be transcribed to provide context for 
understanding the broader components of external support. However, for purposes of 
sound counterterrorism efforts, literature on the utility of external support provides the 
framework for unraveling the complex layers of support which provides for the longevity 
and success of a terrorist organization.  
The Movement of External Support 
 The movement of resources provides tactical context necessary in understanding 
how external support is used. Understanding the utilization of external support requires 
first understanding its point of destination and its source of origin. The literature in this 
section contributes to my argument by enhancing a logistical perspective of interpreting 
external support. Namely, the degree of ambiguity involved in the movement of external 
support delineates the capabilities of counterterrorism efforts. This increases the threat of 
the organization to the global community, effectively sustains operations and their 
support systems and enables longevity of an organization by maintaining an extensive 
network of logistical support.  
There remains a variety of mechanisms by which external support is moved, but 
the literature comprehensively presents three fundamental methods that terrorist 
organizations utilize to transfer external support. The first is through the use of the 
financial system, the second utilizes physical human movements and the third is through 
the operational logistics of the international trade system.
59
 ―The multiplicity of 
organizational structures employed by terrorist networks, the continuing evolution of 
techniques in response to international measures and the opportunistic nature of terrorist 
financing all make it difficult to identify a favored or most common method of 
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 Utilizing the three methods of movement enable terrorist groups to meet 
their needs and sustain their organization within an enabling environment. Adhering to 
direct operational support requirements and the broader support activity requirements are 
essential to the existence of terrorist organizations, thus these three comprehensive 
methods are essential to the literature on this topic.  
 Broader support activities which include maintaining a group’s capacity, often are 
best facilitated using the conventional financing system.
61
 By doing so, funds can be 
secure by hiding behind the veil of legitimacy as discussed in the previous sections, thus 
movement of financial support systems remain effective and efficient. The speed and 
ease of the conventional financial system allows supporters an effective mechanism of 
contribution which transcends legal, political, or geographical limitations. Money and 
value transfer mechanisms are used for large scale fund transferring operations and with 
small scale alternative remittance systems.
62
 This method of movement refers to financial 
transactions for an individual through a financial institution by electronic means with the 
intent of making the funds available to a person at another financial institution.
63
 The 
Financial Action Task Force found that in several cases of terrorism, radicals, 
sympathizers and other supporters of terrorist organizations utilized global operating 
money transfer companies to send or receive funds.
64
 This literature presented the 
opportunity to evaluate a significant weakness of terrorist organization’s reliance on 
financial movement systems.
65
 Electronic financial transfers enabled authorities to 
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develop an organizational map of identifying contacts and the extent of their network.
66
 
While this method of movement has its benefits and enables effective and efficient 
advantages, the risk not only effects the financial implications, but also endangers the 
broader organizational aspects through identification of key players involved in external 
support networks. On the other hand, the two other methods of movement are particularly 
utilized for specific purposes most directed at operational implications such as imminent 
attacks.  
The research drawn from the Financial Action Task Force showed that the 
international trade system is subjected to significant vulnerabilities that enable terrorist 
organizations the opportunity to move value and goods under a veil of legitimacy, similar 
to their financial operations.
67
 For the most part however, the trade system is used to 
launder money. Inaccurate inventories or ambiguity to product values allows for terrorist 
organizations to manipulate the trade system for financial profit.
68
 Simple goods such as 
day to day necessities for operatives are consistently shipped internationally using the 
trade systems. Ingredients for explosives including the chemical and component parts are 
standard products that can often be shipped legitimately in consideration of trade 
regulations. Furthermore, terrorist groups enjoy the benefit of using their external support 
system by eliciting legitimate businesses as the final destination of their trade products. 
By utilizing the international trade system, terrorist groups are able to mitigate suspicion 
of terrorist activities, protect against their source of origin and essentially meet the direct 
operational requirements of the organization. These methods and techniques of 
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manipulating the trade system through legitimate means make counterterrorism efforts 
challenging.  
The physical movement of external support refers to human activity which takes 
individual accountability for the movement of funds, goods and services. The increase of 
international pressure and counterterrorism efforts has compelled terrorist groups to 
decentralize their methods of movement from globalized networks of an electronic utility 
to human couriers.
69
 By doing so terrorist organizations mitigate disruption, operate 
without political and legal limitations and most importantly it adheres to a strong 
foundation of accountability. Detection and identification remain a challenge to 
counterterrorism efforts when resources, including cash funds, are moved through human 
agents.  These implications have compelled a significant rise in the adoption of human 
movement of external support resources and their success remains a challenge to 
counterterrorism efforts.
70
 Apart from eluding authorities, adopting this mechanism is 
often a result of specific countries lacking an electronic banking system.
71
 In many cases 
couriers are used to move finances and goods that were obtained outside of regulated 
markets and intended to remain as such to avoid detection.
72
 When cross border 
regulations interdict the transfer of goods and services, employing human agents to move 




Due to its prevalence among terrorist organization, a brief review of the Hawala 
system is essential to this literature. It is an informal system that fuses the concepts of 
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using, obtaining and moving financial support for terrorist activity which is essential to 
the broader scope of external support. Hawala is the form of transporting financial 
obligations from one place to another without the physical movement of cash and without 
the paper trail.
74
 Trust and honor are distinguishing characteristics that differentiate 
Hawala from the other informal systems utilized throughout external support means.
75
 
Terrorist organizations that wish to move legally obtained funds or launder money raised 
by illegal activities utilize the Hawala system for its security, versatility and anonymity.
76
 
This system is benefited by its legitimacy espoused as a mechanism to fill the void in 
rural areas where people have no access to the former financial system.
77
 Its prevalence is 
seen through its use in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, in South East Asia and 
throughout several parts of Africa.
78
 Despite its legitimacy, terrorist organizations 
manipulate this system to transfer funds that were procured via charities, criminal 
activity, state sponsors and wealthy donors.
79
 The Hawala system is characteristically 
representative of the external support system that provides for the existence of terrorist 
organizations.  
 Due to the nature of their support mechanisms and the fact that terrorism is a form 
of asymmetrical warfare, combating the uses of external support remains a challenge to 
counterterrorism efforts.
80
 Identifying the effects of external support presents a daunting 
task to all parties involved in counterterrorism efforts globally.  The study of external 
support should be less concerned with the source and logistics of the support as most 
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literature presents and more concerned with what the support will be used for. The 
literature presented shows a prevalence of cases by which the raising, moving and using 
of external support for terrorism remains a challenge for counterterrorism efforts. Their 
adaptability and use of legitimate sources make identification and disruption of terrorist 
support networks difficult.
81
 These groups use informal support networks that do not 
operate within a structured organization with clear lines of accountability.
82
 Although the 
source of external support and the mechanism for movement remain to some extent at 
risk, the challenge of external support lies in determining the uses of the support.
83
 The 
utilization of resources are predetermined by the requirements of an organization which 
vary between each group.  
Theory and Hypothesis 
Based on relevant theories in the study of external support of terrorist 
organizations, three common effects most contribute to the existence of terrorist 
organizations. First, the ambiguity and complexity of the external support network 
through their use of a veil of legitimacy increasingly challenges counterterrorism efforts. 
Second, external support increases popular support within the host nation. Lastly, 
external support contributes to the lifecycle of a terrorist, thus creating a formidable 
threat to the global community. This paper will explore the hypothesis that terrorist 
organizations necessitate all three of these common factors to sustain longevity of their 
existence while maintaining an extensive network of direct operational support and 
broader support activities. If this is true I would expect to see counterterrorism efforts 
mitigate the longevity of terrorist organizations through efforts aimed at eradicating only 
                                                          
81




 Drawn from conclusions presented by Force (21).   
27 
 
one common factor, thus fractionalizing their organization and support system over a 
shorter period of time. Organizations like al Qaeda and Hezbollah benefit from an 
extensive external support system and are able to sustain their organization and 
continually utilized their procured resources for a myriad of functions including attacks. 
Countering a fractionalized organization increases the likelihood of success in terms of 
counterterrorism efforts. I concede that terrorism is inevitable and challenging to 
eradicate entirely, however severing the opportunity for longevity diminishes the scale of 
attacks, weakens popular support and fractionalizes broader support activities, thus 
impeding the existence of a terrorist organization.  
 
Case Study 
 Answering the question addressed in this study requires the expectation of 
meeting all three common factors that contribute to the existence of terrorist 
organizations and their extensive networks. These three factors are: 1. Ambiguities and 
complexities of external support through the use of veils of legitimacy which challenge 
counterterrorism efforts. 2. Popular support within a host nation. 3. Extensive financial 
contributions to the lifecycle of a terrorist. Through an evaluation of these three factors, I 
expect to find that in the event that a terrorist organization meets all three, that respective 
organization will reap the benefits of an extensive support network, appear a formidable 
threat to the global community and enjoy a prolonged existence. If only one of these 
factors do not qualify for an organization, then I expect to find that this organization’s 
existence will be short term, their cause will appear trivial and their support network will 
weaken tremendously.  
28 
 
For my case study I will use three organizations that will duly test these 
considerations: al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, better known as 
ETA. Al Qaeda and Hezbollah provide a regional consideration for a great deal of the 
principal interest explored throughout this study. They represent religious-political 
terrorist organizations that use a religious idiom and shape their mandate in divine terms 
with political goals.
84
 More over each organization represents a significant distinguishing 
sect: Sunni (al Qaeda) and Shi’a (Hezbollah), which will delineate a religious bias for 
influence on the three factors being addressed. ETA legitimizes the case study by 
geographically distinguishing itself from the regional concentration of the Middle East. 
They categorize as a National Liberation terrorist organization which further 
distinguishes them from the geo-ideological groups that influence this study. Above all, 
all three groups are recognized as legitimate terrorist organizations by legitimate 
authorities including the United States of America and the European Union, but represent 
significantly different outcomes in accordance to the three factors that will be explored 
within this case study.  
Al Qaeda 
 Al Qaeda represents a fundamental case study in terms of their breadth of external 
support including their extensive financial network that is a model to terrorist 
organizations today. Their means and methods to raise, move and use finances have 
challenged counterterrorism efforts through their use of a cadre of legitimate sources.
85
 
The organization has developed an elusive network and an unconventional web of 
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external support that eludes appropriate authorities by disassociating the real intentions, 
operations and origins of support from legitimate sources.
86
 Doing so maintains a 




 Al Qaeda’s external support system challenges counterterrorism efforts through 
ambiguous and complex methods of utilizing a veil of legitimacy to fund their activities. 
Prior to 9/11 the CIA estimates that it cost al Qaeda $30 million per year to sustain its 
activities.
88
 This statistic rose tenfold following the attacks on the United States and the 
subsequent conflicts in the Middle East against coalition forces. These large sums of 
finances however, required the need of sources which could not only donate large funds, 
but also utilize their legitimacy as a veil for financing terrorism. These financial 
facilitators include donors, charities, mosques and businesses who often are unaware of 
the origins of their donations.
89
 As a result of the success of religious manipulation by al 
Qaeda, charities not only divert their efforts to assisting the needy, but also in support of 
political goals of the organization which viewed Islam as a way to combat Western 
influence.
90
 The use of human agents to penetrate charities and divert funds to the 
organization was one way that the organization utilized charitable organizations. The lax 
of financial oversight, particularly over transactions made in remote regions was a 
vulnerability that al Qaeda not only recognized, but also took advantage of. Saudi charity 
organizations represent a large percentage of al Qaeda financial contributors. 
                                                          
86
 Intelligence Reporting, Apr. 12, 2001. The discussion of al Qaeda financing in this chapter is derived 
from an extensive review of documents from State, Treasury and the intelligence community. As Cited in 
Ibid.  
87
 Ibid, Roth, 18.  
88
 Ibid, Roth, 19.  
89
 Ibid, 20.  
90
 Brisard, Jean-Charles. Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism Financing: Report 
Prepared for the President of the Security Council, United Nations. JCB Consulting, 2003, 26. 
30 
 
Comprehensively, out of 241 operational charities in Saudi Arabia, they receive annually 
between $3 billion to $4 billion. Of those funds 10% to 20% is sent abroad, namely in 
support of al Qaeda and its regional affiliates.
91
  
Another factor that explains the use of charities as a veil of legitimacy is the fact 
that most influential Islamic charities are founded and/or controlled by radical religious 
or political leaders.
92
 One case example is the Muslim World League which was created 
by Said Ramadan who was the son of the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
He and other scholars of Islamic Jurisprudence manipulated religious content to garner 
support from activities by justifying their function in terms that terrorism is not equal to 
Jihad. ―Jihad is meant for upholding right, ending injustice, ensuring peace and security 
and establishing mercy. Terrorism and violence committed by the aggressor who usurp 
the land, desecrate holy sanctuaries and loot wealth cannot be compared to the practice of 
the right of legitimate defense as used by the oppressed seeking to gain their legitimate 
rights to self-determination.‖
93
 Another charitable organization that utilizes its function as 
a veil to fund al Qaeda is the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), founded 
by Osama Bin Laden’s brother in law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa.
94
 The assumptions of 
al Qaeda funding based on the relationship are valid. Investigations of financial controls 
of humanitarian organizations by the Bosnian government found that six organizations 
showed irregularities in their business deals including the IIRO.
95
 The absence of legal 
and proper documentation of their financial activities showed accounting that was not 
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equal to the actual situation determined by inventories.
96
 The weakness in financial 
regulation and Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to control oversight enables charitable 
organizations to operate as a veil of legitimacy for al Qaeda. 
97
 
 The premier mechanism for financial support in Islam was set up under the 
Islamic rule of Zakat, a legal contribution required as one of the five pillars of Islam on 
assets and items of income.
98
  Imams at Mosques across the world were also influenced 
to divert zakat funds by encouraging support for radical Islamic causes.
99
 Zakat funds are 
estimated annually around $10 billion dollars in Saudi Arabia alone.
100
 Oversight of 
Zakat globally lacks oversight of transparency, accounting and auditing, thus enabling a 
legal duty to be utilized as a legitimate instrument to fund terrorism.
101
 By relying on the 
Islamic banking institutions, whose premier function is to contribute and manage Zakat 
funds, Osama Bin Laden partnered with several other Islamic banks to form Al Shamal 
Islamic Bank.
102
 This institution provided funding for al Qaeda operating in the Middle 
East and Africa. 
103
 These funds provide only a gauge of the legitimate sources of income 
for al Qaeda. Funding produced by criminal activities and illegal drug trade operate under 
covert measures, thus making it difficult to quantify this funding, although it is believed 
to measure in the millions of dollars.  
 Popular support of al Qaeda in Pakistan remained high into the latter years of the 
last decade, but has dwindled increasingly since 2008. Polls taken by Terror Free 
Tomorrow, an international public opinion research group, significantly conveyed this 
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notion in their findings. This remains parallel to the popular belief by analysts that al 
Qaeda has fragmented over the last few years into a variety of regional movements that 
are absent of an extensive support network.
104
 Former CIA officer, Marc Sageman 
qualifies al Qaeda as a loose label for a movement that targets the west, but lacks 
organizational significance.
105
 An extensive public opinion survey conducted between 
May 25
th
 and June 1
st
 of 2007 of 1,306 Pakistanis covering urban and rural areas of all 
provinces was conducted in collaboration with the Pakistan Institute for Public 
Opinion.
106
 This survey and subsequent ones, measured public support for al Qaeda, the 
Taliban and Osama Bin Laden. For purposes of this study, the statistics provided will be 
in reference to the findings on public opinion for al Qaeda only. This poll found that half 
of the people polled increasingly support al Qaeda.
107
 A third of Pakistanis held a 
favorable opinion of al Qaeda, down from 46% that held the belief in early 2007, but still 
accounting for the majority.
108
 In fact, when asked who was to blame for violence in the 
region, 52% blamed the United States while only 8% blame al Qaeda.
109
  
 Public support was also measured in terms of al Qaeda’s ideology and goals. An 
alarming 57% of people agreed with their goals and thus supported their agenda.
110
 In 
accordance with this unit of measure, the poll questioned US military action against al 
Qaeda and found that 74% of people oppose this action.
111
 Al Qaeda utilizes their tactics 
of manipulating the support of a host nation to gain popular support. This may come in 
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several forms including through charitable work, humanitarian aid and even perceiving to 
be a lack of threat to society. When asked what country or group posed the greatest threat 
to personal safety, an alarming 44% agreed that it was the USA, as opposed to 8% for al 
Qaeda.
112
 These numbers represent a significant scope into public support of al Qaeda by 
analyzing their influence, impact, and perception on society in Pakistan, a central host to 
the organization.  
 Within months of the public survey showing favorable opinions of al Qaeda, a 
subsequent survey was conducted between January 19 and the 29
th
, which showed public 
support of al Qaeda in Pakistan dropped by half.
113
 The survey was conducted by Terror 
Free Tomorrow: The Center for Public Opinion, D3 Systems and the Pakistan Institute 
for Public Opinion. Favorable opinion of al Qaeda by the Pakistani population is now 
measured at just 18%.
114
 The statistics demonstrate an alarming fear that increased 
terrorist attacks are to blame for a sharp decline in public support. When questioned on 
methods and tactics used by oppositional groups and organizations to bring about change, 
al Qaeda’s use of terrorist attacks measured at an alarming 72% of people that felt this 
tactic to be unjustified.
115
 Nevertheless, despite declining support, 64% of Pakistani 
oppose counterterrorism operations in their country in pursuit of al Qaeda fighters and 
their safe havens.
116
 Unfavorable opinion for al Qaeda at the end of 2007 and beginning 
of 2008 became endemic as a result of their tactics. Despite providing the depth of 
funding to al Qaeda, public support for al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia declined significantly as 
                                                          
112
 Ibid, Tomorrow, 9, (2007).  
113
 Tomorrow, Terror Free. ―Pakistani Support for Al Qaeda, Bin Laden Plunges; Moderate Parties Surge; 
70% Want President Musharraf to Resign: Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan 
Before the February 18
th
 Elections‖. New America Foundation. Washington D.C. January 2008.  
114
 Ibid, Tomorrow, 49.  
115
 Ibid.  
116
 Ibid, Tomorrow, 4.  
34 
 
well, measuring at only 15% of favorable opinion.
117
 Saudi Arabia has been the target of 
a spate of attacks by al Qaeda since operations in Iraq commenced and the utilization of 
suicide bombings as their modus operandi became adopted.
118
 The decline in public 
support is parallel across Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, countries that provide safe haven 
and funding respectively and who also represent a breadth of external support to al 
Qaeda.   
 Although quantitative measures of al Qaeda’s finances remain brief or unknown 
due to the nature of their mechanisms of legitimacy, several qualitative measures allow 
for an explanation of the third factor worth considering; the contribution to the lifecycle 
of a terrorist. That is, what does al Qaeda use its money on for operatives and their 
operations? This literature is broad, but it is able to infer reasonable assumptions that 
qualify a monetary consideration onto the lifecycle of a terrorist. Al Qaeda’s expenses 
were extensive, including funding direct operational support and broad support activities 
such as, maintaining training, contributing to alliances and supporting day-to-day 
necessities of an operative. The CIA estimates that prior to 9/11 it cost al Qaeda $30 
million to sustain these activities.
119
 In an effort to build al Qaeda into a fully operating 
organization, Bin Laden focused heavy resources into the lifecycle of a terrorist.
120
 
Military training and support expenditures were a strategic investment aimed at sustain 
long-term operations. Furthermore, finances were used to pay salaries, provide for their 
training camps, including lodging and food and other living investments necessary for 
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 Adhering to these living conditions was not only essential to the lifecycle of a 
terrorist operating within their safe haven. Maintaining a veil of legitimacy as the 9/11 
hijackers did, provides for a cover as a legitimate member of society. Funding for these 
necessities were a contributing factor in the overall assessment of al Qaeda financing 
which often ranged anywhere from tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars to carry out 
significant attacks. The 1998 Embassy bombing in East Africa cost approximately 
$10,000, the 9/11 attacks cost approximately $400,000-500,000; the October 18, 2002 
Bali Bombings cost approximately $20,000.
122
 Depending on the degree of the attack, it 
remains clear that contributions to the terrorist lifecycle are essential to an organization. 
Their cyclical nature will vary inevitably depending on the scope of the attack, i.e. length 
of time, arms and ammunition, logistics, or distance from host nation. Nevertheless, 
sustainment of this factor allows for operational success as well as the sustainability of an 
organization over a long period of time.  
Hezbollah 
 Hezbollah is perhaps the most ideal terrorist organization that reaps the benefits of 
an extensive external support system through their use of a veil of legitimacy. The 
organization not only acts as a political movement which holds eleven of thirty cabinet 
seats in the Lebanese government
123
, it also acts as a social service provider as well as a 
militia that has been characterized by the United States, European Union, the UK, 
Australian, France, Canada and the Gulf Cooperation Council as a terrorist 
organization.
124
 Although the absence of publicly documented records remains prevalent, 
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studies and intelligence analysis has provided compelling evidence that Hezbollah meets 
all three factors of consideration at the forefront of this study. Their case is unique 
because each factor maintains a causal relationship between the remaining factors. Their 
veil of legitimacy enables public support which in effect allows the organization to enjoy 
extensive funding to their operations including the contribution to the terrorist lifecycle.  
 Hezbollah’s external support system is extensive and enjoys a breadth of 
contributions from varying regional, political and ideological supporters. State 
sponsorship of the organization is significant, Western diplomats believe that from Iran 
alone the organization receives approximately $200 million dollars per year.
125
 State 
sponsorships aid in training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic and organization 
support from countries like Lebanon, Iran and Syria. What is clear is that in addition to 
support received through state sponsorship alone, the organization is supported through 
legitimate businesses, donations from foreign expatriates, charities and other businesses 
that enable Hezbollah’s use of a veil of legitimacy which consequently challenge 
counterterrorism efforts.  
 Hezbollah receives significant financial support from the contributions of 
Hezbollah supporters living abroad particularly from Lebanese nationals living in Africa, 
South America and North America.
126
 Following the crash of the Union Transport 
Africaines Flight 141, it became clear that an official of the African branch of Hezbollah 
and two of his aides were on board and killed. In the wreckage, $2 million were 
discovered and officials determined that the funds were bound for the organization’s 
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 Although intended as a cover of charitable giving, logical 
reasoning assumes that a charitable donation of this magnitude to the city that serves as 
the epicenter of the organization inevitably would be used in an operational funding 
aspect. Hezbollah supporters in the United States also have a role in charitable donations. 
Hezbollah supporters in Charlotte, NC organized meetings in various members’ homes 
where collection plates were passed following viewings of Hezbollah propaganda.
128
 
Authorities investigating the activities of Hezbollah operative Assad Barakat, also 
demonstrate a network of economic financing from Ciudad del Este, Paraguay that was 
sending funds to Lebanon, disguised as a charitable offer intended to benefit families of 
victims of the conflict with Israel.
129
 Charitable funds were diverse as a result of their 
dynamism of origin, as well as their ambiguity of use. They represent only one side of 
Hezbollah’s veil of legitimacy.  
Similar to al Qaeda, Hezbollah uses charities and other front organizations to hide 
its support network, although unlike al Qaeda their reliance on this type of support is 
much less due to the annual subsidies enjoyed by state sponsors like Iran, Syria and 
Lebanon. The veil of legitimacy is significant to Hezbollah’s external support system.  
The al Aqsa International Foundation acted primarily as a front for Hamas, however 
Sheikh Moayad, the head of the organization, was covertly tapped admitting to the 
organization’s office in Europe contributing to Hezbollah’s operations.
130
 Use of the veil 
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of legitimacy is relevant throughout several other locations in the world. The Martyr’s 
Organization admittedly supplies charity to families of suicide bombers.
131
 Paraguayan 
authorities searched the home of Hezbollah operative Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad and found 
receipts totaling more than $3.5 million dollars sent to Hezbollah.
132
 They believe these 
contributions total over $50 million dollars since 1995.
133
 Although proclaimed as a 
charitable donation to families of attackers, these funds undoubtedly are used to pay for 
Hezbollah’s military and terrorist operations.  
Funds of legitimate means enable groups to drape itself in a veil of legitimacy, 
provide members with jobs and to build grassroots support among not only Shi’a, but 
also Sunni and Christian Lebanese as well.
134
 As Assistant Secretary of State E. Anthony 
Wayne testified before Congress in 2003, donating money to charities affiliated to 
terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and al Qaeda, essentially frees up monies to be used 
to support terrorist activities.
135
 The organization is essentially strengthened due to the 
ambiguity between funds for terrorist activities and those for charitable activities.
136
 
Contributions of this nature are objectionable in their own right when they contribute to 
an organization with a deliberate association to a group categorized as a terrorist 
organization or one that supports the families of suicide bombers.
137
 According to US 
intelligence officials, Hezbollah also maintains several front companies which act as a 
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system of support to the organization.
138
 There is little information that is available to the 
public which shows these front companies affiliation to Hezbollah, but they are assumed 
to include import and export companies which are an established modus operandi for 
most terrorist organizations.
139
  The most substantial example of legitimate business 
enterprises being used as a legitimate front was the use of Western Union offices by 
Hezbollah members.
140
 The company failed to vet local operators despite an exponential 
growth over a few short years in areas of conflict.
141
 Hezbollah members that are Western 
Union agents would enable the terrorist organization to get a cut of the 7% service fee 
charge that is split between the company and the agent.
142
 In other cases, members simply 
use the company to transfer and launder significant funds between nations. Hezbollah 
funding to Palestinian terrorist groups in the West Bank are almost entirely transferred 
through the Western Union including $3 Million dollars between 2003 and 2004 alone.
143
  
Hezbollah enjoys extensive external support resources as a result of their popular 
support. Popular support for Hezbollah is significant within Lebanon, but essential from 
the Shi’a population in general. Drawing on a study that used comprehensive survey 
research from Notre Dame University, this paper will demonstrate popular support of 
Hezbollah based on two fronts of correlation: the level of satisfaction with government 
performance and the degree of personal religiosity displayed by the respondents.
144
 
Essentially, Hezbollah’s willingness to provide for its constituents and their message of 
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resistance against Israel strikes resonance between the organization and its supporters.
145
 
The political and social dimension of Hezbollah can be credited with its prevalent support 
base in Lebanon. For purposes of this study I will offer the analysis from the results of 
the measures of government satisfaction and overall support for the organization, so as to 
confine it to the measures that are complicit for understanding how an organization uses 
its popular support. By examining descriptive information on measures of attitudes and 
activities the research is able to account for a comprehensive conclusion on popular 
support of Hezbollah within the host nation. The measurement takes into account six 
dimensions of support for Hezbollah: endorse activities, keep arms, violence in self-
defense, side with party, violence to attain objectives and continue to grow. Based on the 
results from the survey, a few statistics stand out.  First, 84% of respondents felt that 
Hezbollah should maintain a militant wing to the organization, pushing away from a sole 
political facet to the organization.
146
 Second, 62% of respondents overwhelming endorsed 
the organizations activities in general to include political and militant activities.  
In terms of religiosity and its relationship to support for Hezbollah, the results 
were consistent. Religious saliency exhibits a positive relationship with support to 
Hezbollah.
147
 Essentially, respondents who report high levels of religious devotion are 
more likely to support the organizations’ platform and their activities including the 
promotion of violence.
148
 Shi’a respondents, based on the results, essentially show a 
heavier motive of support if Hezbollah displays intense religiosity levels.
149
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The results are not only surprising, but also alarming for counterterrorism efforts. 
First, Hezbollah’s militant aspect is not only an essential consideration to popular 
support, but also necessary to avoid antagonizing members of their host nation.
150
 
Second, actions taken against Hezbollah would in fact coerce a considerable amount of 
supporters to side with the terrorist organization as opposed to a counterterrorist force.
151
 
The use of force against Hezbollah will create a potential for communal conflict and 
inevitably affect the stability of the country.
152
 Popular support in such regard is not only 
essential to an organizational consideration, but also to regional stability.  
Hezbollah’s role in social services plays a significant role in garnering support 
outside of their Shi’a support network. They take on a myriad of social services including 
social development programs, hospitals, educational facilities and institutions, news 
services and even relief efforts.
153
 Jihad al Binna’s Reconstruction Campaign contributes 
to a large number of economic and infrastructure development projects throughout 
Lebanon.
154
 In a country torn by conflict and class stratification being endemic, efforts 
such as these are viewed as a legitimate function of an organization filling the void of a 
significant government and military. An IRIN news report of the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs characterized Hezbollah by identifying that they 
operate: four hospitals, twelve clinics, twelve schools and twelve agricultural clinics 
aimed at providing training for purposes of sustainability.
155
 Their social services are 
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dynamic. It is inarguable that Hezbollah’s organizational structure is strategically 
designed to not only meet their operational needs, but also their support goals including 
garnering popular support of the host nation. They have succeeded tenfold and remain an 
exemplary example to terrorist organizations globally who can utilize popular support as 
a mechanism of external support that contributes to longevity and sustainability of the 
organization.  
Hezbollah’s source of funding as a result of a strong state support network 
enables an increased contribution to the life cycle of a terrorist. Moreover, the cyclical 
nature of their political affairs throughout the Middle East enables their external support 
system to fuel their militant activities. Hezbollah maintains a sizable and constant flow of 
reliable funding as a result of Iran’s largesse.
156
 This in effect allows the organization to 
operate under no revenue restrictions ultimately sustaining the operatives and their 
needs.
157
 Although it remains unclear whether funds are intended for specific purposes or 
means, a concern I addressed throughout the literature review, it is certain that these 
funds contribute to not only broad operational needs of the organization, but also to direct 
individual needs of a terrorist. Resources for operational execution, including preplanning 
are just as fundamental as everyday needs of living such as food, lodging and clothes. 
The lack of evidence in terms of the function of finances suggests that funds are used for 
a wide array of needs including covert and overt activities.
158
 With a budget that appears 
durable and consistent as a result of an extensive system of state and local funding, 
Hezbollah’s ability to sustain operations is inconceivable. Their lack of need to concern 
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themselves with contributions to the lifecycle of a terrorist allows resources to be used in 
other areas of need appropriate to the organization.  
Specifically, Hezbollah’s funds are used to further the group’s overall agenda of 
establishing a Shi’a entity in Lebanon and radicalize Muslims against the West.
159
 
Contributions to political and social activities contribute to the lifecycle of a terrorist in a 
more indirect fashion like radicalizing others for recruitment, use of social organizations 
for networking and resource procurements and providing a cover for operatives. Wages 
are paid to its operatives and annuities are paid to the families of killed or capture 
members.
160
 Lastly, Hezbollah seeks to provide its members with jobs through its vast 
social and political networks. 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)  
 ETA provides dynamism to this study by representing a nationalist organization 
that meets the standards for evaluation and has been categorized by the United States and 
European Union as a terrorist organization. Their support network remains limited in 
comparison to the previous two terrorist organizations that enjoy a global network of 
external support. Nevertheless, they remain a formidable threat to Spain and warrant 
careful evaluation of the three factors at stake which are a determinant of its existence. 
 The study of the financial network which enables ETA to operate demonstrates 
that much like the previous two cases, ETA learned to adapt their sources of income 
between criminal, legal and illegal activities in an effort to maintain a semi-legal source 
of income.
161
 The discovery of ETA’s veil of legitimacy happened first in 1986, when 
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Spanish and French authorities dismantled an innocent looking workshop that belonged 
to a member and would later be identified as ETA’s nerve center of operations in the 
town of Sokoa, off the French coast.
162
 Bookkeeping that was found in the operation 
revealed a web of economic networks that not only financed terrorist activity, but also 
showed investments into the political network affiliated with the organization. €120 
Euros were paid to buy out newspapers and magazines, as well as funds to provide capital 
to trade unions and political parties.
163
 The web was not only intended to grow, but it was 
to do so by legitimate means.  By the beginning of 1990 the legitimate network included 
the political coalition HB, the trade union LAB, the youth organization Jarrai and the 
coordinating arm for grassroots and popular organization KAS, the organization for 
promotion Basque language called Euskal Herrian Euskaraz, the patriotic student 
organization Ikasle Abertzaleak and other feminist, ecologist and cultural groups.
164
 
These groups were complimented with other legitimate businesses that were used to 
supplement profits and launder money that was gained by illegal means.
165
 ETA 
established businesses that were employed by sympathizers with the intention that profits 
gained would be utilized to fund illegal activities. They relied on an extensive employee 
base so that the legitimacy of their business would grow, but also blur the lines between 
legitimacy and illegal activities in the eyes of authorities.  
 The network of accomplices widened so immensely that the existence of ETA 
became an economic necessity to the Basque people and the economic value of the 
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  In addition to the media networks that ETA bought, they also invested 
into the Herriko Tabernak, a chain of bars and restaurants across a swath of the Basque 
region that would serve as a meeting place for sympathizers of the organization.
167
 From 
this location ETA had a strategic location of control of the immediate surroundings and it 
provided a place to plan acts of violence.
168
  
The economic network became so widespread that in 1992 ETA organized the Udaletxe 
project which sought to manage and distribute the profits from the 100 businesses that 
make up the terrorist network.
169
 The decision to streamline these legitimate sources 
inevitably contributed to the demise of ETA. Following the ruling by the Spanish 
National and Supreme Court, ETA and its legitimate sources became guilty by 
association. Subsequent charges and liquidations diminished the veil of legitimacy that 
ETA once enjoyed. In an effort to continue secessionist efforts and violence ETA 
redesigned their networks with various entities that were not tarnished by the legal 
ramifications.
170
 They focused on two objectives, a company that could control logistical 
support through KAS and propaganda means through the newspaper Egin, both of which 
would eventually be eliminated by legal means.
171
  
 In an effort to revamp its veil of legitimacy and contribute politically, ETA also 
focused its efforts on controlling a political party which they found in Batasuna.
172
 ETA’s 
institutional gains by obtaining this party in their control has enabled a large political 
representation in the Basque region, but more importantly it acted as a way of channeling 
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economic resources to the terrorist organization.
173
 Although ETA utilized Batasuna for a 
great deal of their financing, in 2003 the Spanish Supreme Court banned the political 
party which automatically cut them off from state funding that is received by all legal 
political parties with Parliament representation.
174
 Essentially, ETA’s veil of legitimacy 
was Batasuna, who enjoyed the benefits of political representation, but who’s association 
with a terrorist network, led to their demise.    
 Analyzing ETA’s popular support requires a historical analysis which is cyclical 
in their actions and the rise and fall of popular support. Compared to the rest of the 
provinces in Spain the Basque people differ greatly.
175
 Economic resources of their land 
are rich and have thus become a focal point of the Spanish government who wished to 
invest in the resources.
176
 It was inevitable that a separatist movement would form; 
differing social constructs and an environment that could sustain a population compelled 
an uprising. As the separatist movement grew under the brutal dictatorship of General 
Francisco Franco, ETA was created and positively viewed due to their views on race, 
religion and socialism.
177
 ETA’s assassination of San Sebastian police commissioner 
Meliton Manzana in 1968, who was notorious for torture, not only solidified the severity 
of their claims, but also gained a wide array of public support.
178
 The public support 
acted as fuel to continued violence from ETA. Their concentrated effort to target political 
and governmental figures legitimized their agenda. Moreover, 77% of ETA attacks were 
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carried out in the Basque region.
179
 In effect, staying true to their claims garnered popular 
support during a time that political perception of the dictatorship was overwhelmingly 
negative. As it was seen, popular support during the dictatorship was increasingly 
positive for ETA. However, Spain’s transition to a democracy in 1975 and ETA’s 
increase of violence, specifically in the 1980’s resulted in a steady loss of support.
180
 
Their progressive radicalization made it difficult for Spaniards to empathize with the 
organization.
181
 Moreover, Spain’s willingness to make concessions by granting relative 
autonomy among the Basque Provinces demonstrated a step backward for ETA who was 
unwilling to compromise on any one concession and continued violent action.
182
 ETA’s 
erosion of support came most notably with the kidnapping and assassination of a Spanish 
politician for the Popular Party, Miguel Angel Blanco Garrido. His death was not only 
important to Spanish society, but also in Basque society where ETA’s own supporters 
condemned the killing.
183
 In the subsequent year following the assassination of Garrido, 
the Spanish elections showed a statistical erosion of ETA support. Batasuna, ETA’s 
political wing, earned only 10% of votes down from previous elections.
184
  
 ETA enjoyed an extensive support system from its inception in 1959 to its first 
killing in 1968. Their violent radicalization reduced their cause of independence to a 
violent political movement that paralleled that of several Islamic militant groups like the 
PLO.
185
 Their purpose and rationale no longer appealed to the greater majority of 
Spaniards who saw no need for secession. The Euskobarometro, a survey conducted by 
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Universidad del Pais Vasco, measured the views of the Basque population, those most 
inclined to support ETA.
186
 The results were as follows: 64% rejected ETA entirely, 13% 
were former sympathizers who no longer support the group, 10% agreed with their ends, 
but not their means, 1 % gave ETA total support and 48% of Batasuna voters rejected 
ETA’s violence.
187
 Although they maintain a presence today, they have been inactive 
politically and violently since October 2011. 
 Although ETA’s contribution to the lifecycle of a terrorist does not resemble the 
previous two organizations in terms of needs, the organization sought to finance itself 
merely in terms of broader support activities. That is, contributions to resources needed to 
carry out a specific attack. Day to day necessities, long term logistical resources and other 
direct operational resources were of no consideration simply as a result of the nature of 
ETA’s attacks. They were regionally confined to the provinces of the Basque region. 
They were often short term considerations and did not always require a suicide mission 
for success of the objective. Extortion has undoubtedly become one of ETA’s main 
sources of income. From 1978 to 2008 alone this practice garnered 115 million Euros 
based strictly off of records that have been obtained, thus suggesting this number to be a 
minimum. In terms of contributing to a terrorist lifecycle however, it is reasonable to 
assume that the practice of extortion requires minimal funding. Thus low cost resources 
such as intelligence and strategic planning are all the resources necessary in such a case.  
 Contributions to a terrorist lifecycle in terms of a terrorist organization that 
pursues a regional agenda and nationalist intents, requires much broader support activities 
than the long term resources required for transnational missions such as those carried out 
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by al Qaeda and Hezbollah. Nevertheless, in terms of testing the factor within this study, 
the historical analysis presented earlier in the popular support literature demonstrates a 
compelling argument that with the demise of the organization due to the loss of popular 
support, the resources necessary to contribute to the lifecycle of a terrorist would have 
suffered as well. While the organization remained rich in resources preceding the legal 
crackdown and loss of popular support, these events would have compelled ETA to 
refocus its resources and rely much more heavily on self-financing. Fruitful agendas that 
benefitted from a rich external support system would inevitably narrow to include only 
prioritized plans of secession and linguistic preservation. The organization as a whole can 
no longer support the lifecycle of a terrorist without the backing of a strong external 
support system.  
Results and Discussion 
 Based on the relevant theories presented throughout literature, my methodology 
and case study sought to analyze three common factors and determine that if only one 
common factor did not exist or appeared weak, then the chances of longevity for that 
organization were unlikely. After analyzing the research to include quantitative and 
qualitative information, I think my hypothesis worked adequately but with limitations. 
The breadth of information presented on large terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and 
Hezbollah, as well as their extensive external support networks allowed for the 
information to answer the three factors at stake. Moreover, just as history as proved 
respective to each organization which have been around for decades, meeting the three 
factors has enabled both organizations to experience longevity. However, within the 
analysis of ETA, who suffers from a much smaller external support system there remains 
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little quantifiable information to support the contribution to a terrorist lifecycle factor. 
Reasonable conclusions can be drawn from the information, but concrete evidence lacks. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that they do not meet the standard of popular support and thus 
their lack of active existence today holds this argument to be true. Their lack of popular 
support challenges their funding which in effect diminishes their ability to contribute to 
the lifecycle of a terrorist. 
It remains clear that Hezbollah benefits from a vast and extensive support network 
which provides for an extensive existence. Hezbollah meets all of the criteria tested in 
this study and thus satisfies the hypothesis at stake. Popular support is not only the result 
of militant activities influenced by religiosity, but rather the veil of legitimacy provides 
for popular support. Hezbollah in essence, serves a legitimate function in Lebanon 
sociopolitical culture, while simultaneously acting as a proxy to other state’s agendas 
throughout the Middle East. Their social services are dynamic and their reliable funding 
enables their contributions to terrorist activity to go unrestricted. Hezbollah remains an 
ideal example for terrorist organizations that utilize their external support system to 
provide longevity to their existence. 
Al Qaeda has an extensive veil of legitimacy through their use of charities, Zakat, 
illegal activities, and legitimate businesses. These covers create a challenge to 
counterterrorism efforts because they are unable to interpret the uses of external support. 
Identification of sources and uses essentially become unknown as a result. Contributions 
to the lifecycle of a terrorist are a strategic investment, namely as a result of al Qaeda’s 
transnational agenda. Although al Qaeda enjoyed popular support for most of their 
existence, since 2008 it has dwindled immensely. Their radicalized violence has been 
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largely to blame. As a result the organization has fragmented into several regional 
movements. The organization is even believed to represent an identity as opposed to an 
actual organization. This notion holds true to the hypothesis at stake. In the event that 
popular support has dwindled, so too has the organization. It has fragmented as my 
hypothesis believed, thus creating less of a strategic threat to counterterrorism efforts.  
 ETA enjoyed an extensive network of legitimacy that perhaps inevitably became 
its downfall. Affiliated businesses and organizations inevitably became guilty by 
association following legal ramifications brought down upon the organization by Spanish 
courts. Their historical relevance essentially defined their means to their end. With the 
democratic transition and ETA’s increased use of violence, popular support through 
Spain including the Basque region dropped dramatically. This in effect, constituted the 
demise of ETA. Moreover, as this case study presented, the inability of ETA to meet all 
three factors proved my hypothesis correct. ETA was challenged by inadequacies of 
popular support that in effect made it difficult to contribute to the lifecycle of a terrorist. 
As a result, they not only lost their extensive external support system, but also became 
fractionalized to the degree of calling five different ceasefires, one of which has 
continued today and contributed to their nonexistence of political or militant activity. 
 Based on the analysis provided in this chapter, the effects of external support are 
subjective based on the organization. That is, successful terrorist groups often are able to 
receive more external support. Just as politicians with name recognition obtain more 
funding from outside sources, transnational terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and 
al Qaeda are able to inspire external support. This effect is a direct result of the 
inspiration and acquisition of popular support in and out of a host nation. Popular support 
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is not only a necessary factor for long term survival, but it also distinguishes between 
which groups are able to receive more external support. An organization in its infancy 
would be intelligent to carefully examine its actions based on popular support as a 
mechanism to garner an extensive external support system. 
 The case studies presented were well qualified cases which not only test al Qaeda, 
Hezbollah and ETA, but also the structure of the test itself. As the findings suggested, 
large organizations like al Qaeda and Hezbollah are useful to test due to their extensive 
support networks, breadth of literature, and relevance to the global community. However, 
ETA presented a challenge. Available information that could be plugged into the three 
factors was challenging to come by and necessitated reasonable and logical assumptions 
to be drawn at some points. Moreover, it was clear that the distinction between religious-
political organizations and nationalist ones presented varying challenges, more so on the 
part of nationalist organizations. The interests at stake in effect, challenge all three factors 
because organizations that seek independence are often blind to the three factors that 
were tested due to their overwhelming belief in violence to achieve their aims. Whereas 
terrorist organizations that are motivated by religious and political implications 
necessitate meeting the three factors. Their goals are often political: recognition, territory, 
concessions from state and thus they must meet the three factors not only for success of 
their agenda, but also for longevity of their existence.  
 Given the insights provided by this chapter regarding external support, there is a 
breadth of literature on funding operations. Counterterrorist efforts which are intended to 
severely weaken, if not collapse an organization have been successful in freezing or 
attacking these funding networks. This paper contributes to existing literature by 
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providing the need for counterterrorist operations outside of funding operations which 
can also attack or freeze an external support system. Although this paper does not 
highlight specific instances of the latter occurring, it is not intended to disregard the 
notion of it ever happening. By the nature of national security interests and the role of 
covert operations, the information is either limited or not available to the public. 
Counterterrorism efforts that seek to fragment external support systems, leading to the 
collapse of the organization are possible based on the analysis provided. 
 
Conclusion 
Although the literature presented on this topic is consistently redundant through 
the evaluation of logistical considerations and terrorist financing, it is necessary to 
understand in order to effectively evaluate the uses of external support. The literature aids 
in providing context to external support by looking at the ways in which terrorist 
organizations raise and move finances and surface consumption on how they use 
finances. While this literature is essential for context, its uses in terms of practical 
implications remain weak. Nevertheless, for purposes of this thesis, the context provided 
helps readers better understand the two following chapters which narrow the scope of the 
portfolio through specific tactics and strategies considered in the decision making 
process.   
Resourcefulness of large organizations like al Qaeda and Hezbollah not only 
enable sustainability of their operations, but it also severely challenges counterterrorism 
efforts. As the study showed in the case of al Qaeda, in the event that an organization 
does not meet the standard of one of the three factors they will in effect suffer in terms of 
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their existence. Al Qaeda has been reduced to being labeled an identity for radicalized 
movements. Fractionalization of their organization is a serious method of 
counterterrorism efforts that should be tested increasingly in the future. Hezbollah not 
only enjoys the benefits of an extensive external support network, but they are further 
enabled as a result of state sponsorship. This not only contributes to their existence, but in 
effect threatens counterterrorism efforts for fear of countering popular support of the host 
nation. 
Good social science has a predictive element to it, meaning, patterns that repeat 
themselves and thus provide valuable insight. Based on the analysis in this chapter it is 
logical to predict that counterterrorism efforts aimed at undermining external support 
outside of funding operations will provide actionable efforts that will destabilize 
operational capabilities and infrastructure support of a terrorist organization. Attacking a 
group’s veil of legitimacy and popular support will severely weaken their chances for 
long term survival. 
Understanding external support systems by looking at factors that determine a 
terrorist organizations existence enables counterterrorism efforts to improve their 
situational awareness in contemporary operational environments. That is, by narrowly 
confining their efforts to single factors that determine an organizations’ existence, 
counterterrorism forces can mitigate broad strategies that lack a timetable and confine 
resources to specific engagements that will produce effective results. This chapter is able 
to contribute to efforts that seek to accomplish the latter. Moreover, it effectively 
contributes to a void in present literature that is focused on operational reasoning and 
logistical considerations of external support. This chapter attacks the commonalities of 
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external support and implications for understanding these factors to determine how uses 
effect existence. Moreover, it tests three common factors that are prevalent throughout 
the literature to determine how understanding the uses of external support are not only 
much more relevant to the discussion, but also much more necessary for counterterrorism 
efforts. This chapter follows a macro examination of the terrorist decision making 
process by focusing on the group dynamic. This is effective in conveying a general study 
of the role of tactics and strategies in the decision making process. The following chapter 
will narrow the scope of the portfolio by addressing a specific strategic calculation 































The Motivation of Suicide Terrorism as a Modus Operandi 
 
The decision for terrorist organizations to utilize suicide terrorism as their modus 
operandi is not a new phenomenon, but the frequency of this method on a world scale 
necessitates attention. Suicide terrorism has proven to be an equalizer to a more 
globalized and technologically advanced opposition. The psychological vulnerability 
espoused by suicide terrorism is an effect in its own right, however the practical effects of 
the attack itself provides implicit values for terrorist organizations that utilize this 
method. Exploring the motivations of organizations that employ suicide terrorism enables 
the opportunity to understand the rationality behind the suicide attack phenomenon and 
thus the degree to which it has become an equalizer. The attacks of September 11, 2001 
on the World Trade Centers elicited the American response to suicide terrorism, but the 
method is historically rooted throughout the world, characterized by an evolution of 
tactics which adhere to an organization’s cause in a barbaric, yet theatrical manner. 
Suicide terrorism is a means of warfare that is a contemporary method with a modern 
utility and rationality.   
Modern literature often attributes suicide terrorism to Islamic radicalism, however 
this chapter will demonstrate the motivations behind suicide terrorism are much more 
complex than a religious obligation. As will be discussed later in the chapter, many 
scholars believe suicide terrorism is conducted out of pure fanaticism, however this 
chapter will show that logic and strategic calculation are utilized in the decision to 
employ suicide attacks. This is profound to the overall thesis which views this strategic 
consideration as symbiotic with the two other chapters in this portfolio. The terrorist 
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decision making process is one of strategic and methodical calculation, as this chapter 
will exemplify.  This chapter will show that although the motivations behind suicide 
attacks differ from organization to organization, the success behind this modus operandi 
outweigh alternative options for employing terrorism. The unpredictability and sheer 
difficulty in identifying prospective suicide bombers makes counterterrorism efforts 
difficult to counter in regards to this method.  
This chapter seeks to determine what motivates terrorist organizations to use 
suicide terrorism as their modus operandi. The study will examine the two categories that 
suicide attackers generally belong to; the individual and the group which is representative 
of the literature that exists on suicide terrorism. Although this chapter is focused with the 
tactical use of suicide terrorism for organizational objectives, the individual often is 
sympathetic to a group cause or manipulated to represent group ideology. Thus, the 
individual is evaluated in this study because they act as a platform for executing group 
objectives. Additionally, the role of a group is essential in understanding suicide 
terrorism. Individuals may act as platforms for executing suicide missions, however as 
the literature will demonstrate, the role of the organization is most at play in the study of 
motivations behind suicide terrorism.  
The argument will proceed as follows. I will first define what is meant by 
motivations of the individual and group. By analyzing the motivations, the study of 
suicide terrorism is productive in its measures to thwart these influences that compel 
individuals to act in suicide terrorism. These efforts will come about through ideological 
and social efforts. Next, I will define what is meant by suicide terrorism. The subsequent 
section will examine literature that examines the two categories that suicide attackers 
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belong to: an individual and groups. Exploring these two groups will compel this study to 
stratify the employment of suicide attacks into two distinct groups with respective 
motivations that all operate with an organizational objective. Also, as the literature will 
demonstrate, these two groups account for a general exploration of suicide terrorism. This 
chapter will conclude by evaluating a case study of three organizations that account for 
most suicide attacks around the world: the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda. This 
case study will utilize the Tamil Tigers as a secular organization to denounce a general 
belief that religion bears sole responsibility behind suicide terrorism. Doing so will 
establish a foundation for interpreting the group dynamic. Political and social 
implications effect an organizations employment of suicide terrorism.  The study will 
utilize Hezbollah and al Qaeda for a non-secular perspective representing the opposing 
Shiite and Sunni Islamic denominations respectively. This evaluation will demonstrate a 
radical ideological justification for the two organizations and will emphasize 
manipulation of leadership capabilities as a means of justifying suicide terrorism as an 
effective utility for their respective cause.  The prevalence of suicide terrorism is 
identifiable within all of these organizations both from an individual and groups 
perspective. After assessing each groups goals, this study will evaluate the ideological 
justifications and operational advantages as metrics to establish a correlation between 
suicide attacks and success. This will seek to show how motivations to employ suicide 
terrorism are much more complex than religious obligations and incentives. With such 
efforts these case studies will determine whether suicide terrorism has become an 
equalizer to a more globalized and technologically advanced opposition. Cost-effect 
analysis in practical and quantitative means throughout the cast studies will seek to prove 
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the hypothesis by evaluating how motivations influence the decision for terrorist 
operations to employ suicide terrorism as their modus operandi.   
 
Defining the Concepts 
 For the purpose of this study, the language used to explore this analysis will draw 
on the work of Audrey Cronin.
188
 The language and terms are specifically chosen to 
reflect the perception of the ideas presented in this chapter and the portfolio as a whole. 
Although there may not be a term that is a perfect explanation of the ideas presented due 
to restrictive meanings or unintended perception associated in the discussion of terrorism, 
this study will refer to the physical means of a suicide attack.
189
 Doing so will alleviate 
the generalization of bombers, or lone wolfs, and instead create a sense of mission to the 
perpetrators. This term refers to the event where the success of the operation cannot occur 
without the death of the perpetrator, and he or she is aware of their imminent death.
190
 
Suicide attacks of this nature are generally carried out by individuals labeled as terrorists, 
which alludes to non-state actors whose goal is the threat or use of violence for political 
means or ideological justification against combatants, non-combatants, or civilian 
targets.
191
 Suicide attacks thus remain an appropriate term in their abundant use 
throughout the study. This follows a suitable definition similar to that which described 
terrorist organizations in the first chapter, but with an individual consideration. The 
reference to suicide terrorism for these very reasons is an adequate representation of the 
variables at play.  
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The Origins of Suicide Terrorism 
 
 Although suicide terrorism has been brought to global attention over the past two 
decades, most notably following the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade 
Centers, the history of this phenomenon is rich, dating back centuries. The ancient 
practice of suicide attack dates back to 18
th
 century tactics used by two notorious sects, 
the Jewish sect of Zealots (Sicairis) in Roman occupied Judea and the Islamic Order of 
Assassins (Hashishiyun) during the early Christian Crusades.
192
 ―While their actions do 
not directly affect the intellectual evolution of contemporary suicide bombers, their 
actions demonstrate precedent and the ability of theologians to interpret Islamic doctrine 
to justify suicide terrorism.‖
193
 The organizational aspect of suicide bombing came about 
in the mid-20
th
 century with the emergence of the tokkotai, special attack military units 
that are more commonly referred to as Kamikaze pilots. Idiosyncrasies of successful 
suicide terrorism were present then as they are today. ―Choice is often voluntary, but 
typically under conditions of group pressure and charismatic leadership.‖
194
 Suicide 
attack is most often employed as a measure of strategic desperation. Although conceived 
as a desperate response to losing the war, Kamikaze pilots were used as both a strategic 
weapons system and as a message of fanaticism with the conveyance of intimidation to 
its foes.
195
 Despite the debate over effectiveness of suicide attacks over the course of 
time, it is unarguable to deny the level of coercion such attacks can convey.  
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Recent History: Middle East Influence 
 
The current phenomenon of suicide terrorism is more closely associated with 
Middle East terrorist organizations. The first modern suicide bombing took place on 
December 15, 1981 with the bombing of the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut by the Iraqi Shi’a 
Islamist group al-Dawa. More importantly, this is the emergence of state-sponsored 
terrorism. Such a decision to utilize suicide attacks is predisposed under the assumption 
that suicide terrorism is a utility against a resourcefully strong opposition. Although this 
attack’s author is still unknown, ―it is likely that Ayatollah Khomeini approved its use by 
parties sponsored by Iranian intelligence‖
196
 in its struggle against the Iraqi government. 
Ideological motivation, which will be explored following this literature, provides a 
characteristic of suicide terrorism as a strategic investment for  terrorist organizations.  
Suicide bombing came into American limelight in October of 1983 when a 
suicide bomber detonated a truck filled with explosives on a Marine barracks in Lebanon, 
killing himself and 241 service men and women. ―These bombings and several other 
high-profile blasts before them were the handiwork of Shiite militant groups sponsored 
by Iran, which would coalesce in the mid-1980’s into Hezbollah.‖
197
 Moreover, the 
subsequent withdrawal of U.S. and French forces from Lebanon has created both reason 
and context by al Qaeda for the use of suicide terrorism as an effective means.
198
 The 
success of Hezbollah’s role in suicide bombings spread throughout the Middle East and 
Asia. In late 1992 and early 1993 Palestinian terrorist organizations Hamas and 
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Palestinian Islamic Jihad utilized suicide bombing for various political and religious 
motivations.  
 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) offer an opportunity to explore 
suicide bombing as a utility and weapons system within the context of secularism. The 
employment of suicide attacks was not narrowed to a religious means of warfare. The 
LTTE, whose motivation is rooted in Nationalism and the creation of a Tamil state, have 
carried out the bloodiest campaign of suicide attacks in modern history.
199
 In fact, they 
account for more than half of suicide attacks carried out since Hezbollah’s use against the 
Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983.  Their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran who has 
claimed inspiration from Hezbollah’s attack of 1983, has systematically organized his 
group into what has been called the ―Masters of Suicide Bombing‖.
200
 
The organizationally sound and systematic use of suicide attacks from its origins 
to today provided context that suicide terrorism was not solely the result of religious 
extremism. The literature explored in this chapter will draw primarily from four experts 
in the field of suicide terrorism: Robert Pape, Audrey Cronin, Martha Crenshaw and 
Boaz Ganor. The utilization of suicide terrorism was a means of several different 
overlapping reasons including fanaticism, religion, political and strategic, which is 
referenced throughout this portfolio. ―In each case, a shift to the use of suicide attacks, 
followed a period of unsuccessful open warfare against a militarily stronger 
[opposition].‖
201
 Thus, the use of suicide terrorism was both a means of response and a 
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strategic measure to continued awareness of their cause.
202
 This notion justifies this thesis 
as a whole. The decision making process is a methodology that is constructed through 
symbiotic relationships through the use of calculated tactics and strategies. Historically, 
as presented previously, suicide terrorism is not unique to a given time period or class of 
individuals, however the utility of this tactic has gained prominence. Groups such as 
―Muslim (both Shi’ite and Sunni), Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Jewish and secular 
organizations…‖ have adopted the use of suicide attacks.
203
 These organizations are a 
reflection of contemporary reality. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, 
organizations that have employed suicide terrorism as a utility and strategic investment in 
their cause include, but are not limited to: Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, the Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam, al Qaeda, and Lashkar-e-taiba to name a few.
204
 
Motivations of the Individual 
 
 Historic misunderstandings have long surrounded the subject of suicide terrorism 
at its core. Moreover, the common perception of a rational audience would view those 
who take part as suicide terrorist as crazy and lunatics. As literature shows however, the 
social environment of would-be suicide bombers are in fact contradictory to such a 
perception. ―A number of scholars have attempted to understand this extreme behavior by 
looking for clues in the (a) psychological profiles of the suicide bombers, (b) external 
conditions of poverty or other economic woes, or (c) chaotic discourse of religious belief 
and ideology.‖
205
 Despite these attempts, a consensus of literature willfully determines 
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that psychological profiles produce contradictory results. More often than not, suicide 
bombers have made a rational choice to carry out their attack based on a myriad of beliefs 
that justify their personal motivations.  
 Historically, suicide bombers were thought to emanate from poverty and 
economic hardship. Past experts who profiled suicide terrorists characterized them often 
as uneducated, unemployed, and socially isolated.
206
 Modern profiles contradict this 
belief. For example, modern day al Qaeda members, including those responsible for the 
attacks of 9/11, originate from middle and upper class families.
207
 Such individuals have 
had opportunities in life for economic prosperity, career aspirations and social fortunes. 
Nevertheless, this profile has become commonplace in the study of suicide bombers. 
Poverty and economic hardship are no longer sole explanations in the case of suicide 
terrorism, although it is a contributing factor. 
 Psychological profiles further contradict mainstream thought of psychological 
pathology existent within suicide bombers.
208
 Rational choice, premeditated decisions, 
and consequential analysis disparage an individual considered mentally unstable from 
those considered coherent. Although most cases of suicide terrorist exhibit these cogent 
characteristics, this is not meant to eliminate the possibility of psychological pathology 
playing a role in the decisions of suicide terrorists. Palestinian psychologist note common 
characteristics present in many suicide bombers including, but not limited to: social 
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isolation, depression, feelings of hopelessness, guilt and shame. 
209
 However, the 
psychological profile of suicide victims in general fits this description. That is to say, 
where suicide victims and suicide bombers differ rests in the decision to end one’s life, or 
that of many others.  
 Selfish motivation is common place in the individual decision to carry out a 
suicide attack. Motivations that illicit the individual to carry out suicide attacks are 
commonplace in other acts of terrorism as well, including notoriety, revenge, anger, and 
simple commitment to the cause.
210
 The informal links of revenge strengthen the 
discussion of the individual within the scope of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorist have 
even come in the form of widows, seeking revenge for their husbands death in Jihad.
211
 
That has become commonplace in modern day suicide attacks. Women or other kin 
seeking revenge for their loved ones, while maintaining commitment to an ideological 
cause has strengthened the individual in its decision to carry out suicide attacks.  
As Martha Crenshaw claims in her comparative analysis of suicide terrorism, 
martyrdom offers the individual the opportunity to impress an audience and add 
significance to a life of hopelessness. The act is thought to impress those in support and 
add heroism and glory to the act of self-sacrifice, ultimately solidifying their name into 
righteous history.
212
 Moreover, the individual consideration in this chapter contributes to 
the broader organizational consideration in chapter one by supporting the need for 
popular support as a factor to enable longevity to an organization’s existence. The 
longstanding association of martyrdom and heroism has often glorified the role of a 
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suicide bomber within secular and non-secular cultures. Self-sacrifice in the form of 
suicide terrorism would not be employed if it did not work. Thus, the frequency and rise 
of suicide terrorism righteously assumes that this tactic works because ―unless 
martyrdom was valued by society or at least by a subculture, individuals would not seek 
it.‖
213
 Furthermore, the decision to give up one’s life for a cause is not taken lightly both 
by the individual and supporters of the cause that they represent. Suicide terrorism not 
only functions as a measure of propaganda, but also creates authenticity and legitimizes 
the cause.
214
 These properties alone are a conduit of support and recruitment not only to 
the cause, but to the decision of self-sacrifice.  Consequently, the motivation behind the 
individual strengthens the role of suicide terrorism as a tactic.  
Undoubtedly the analysis of the individual motivation behind suicide terrorism, 
distinguishes modern and contemporary thought of suicide terrorism. Motivations vary 
from individual to individual in their decision to become suicide terrorists and their broad 
spectrum of lifestyles and upbringing further solidify this notion. Although the individual 
has control over the choice of self-sacrifice, the group perspective accounts for the 
abilities to manipulate beliefs, ideology and the psychological perspective of life for 
potential suicide terrorists.
215
 Thus, literature on the group perspective is critical in the 
study of suicide terrorism.  
The Group’s Role in Suicide Terrorism 
 
 Suicide terrorism as a broad topic, has always maintained an organizational aspect 
to its employment. Although carried out by one or several individuals, suicide attacks 
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have most often been used by terrorist organizations with a systematic apparatus for 
fulfilling their mission objectives. The organization’s responsibilities in the use of suicide 
terrorism are seen in the timeline, resource and technological acquisition, targeting, 
ideological inspiration to the suicide bomber, and overall execution of the attack. 
216
 Most 
importantly, terrorist organizations have come to realize that suicide terrorism is an 
effective and coercive utility that has historically compelled concessions and strategically 
paid off.
217
 The utility of suicide terrorism is one that demonstrates a strategic choice for 
terrorist organizations and enables a variety of advantages in their efforts for the cause 
they represent.  
 Suicide terrorism utilizes a manipulated form of justification for its use. What is 
meant by this is that regardless of the logistics behind the attack including location, 
timing, or target selection, the justification for such an attack will always serve in the 
interest of the organization.  The interests at stake for any given suicide attack are broad, 
ranging from nationalist goals, concessions, territorial disputes, religious or ideological 
motivations and many more. This most notably comes as a consequence of catastrophic 
attacks that produce high degrees of casualties and extensive damage. Such an attack 
creates a media frenzy which inevitably ―indicates a display of great determination and 
inclination for self-sacrifice on the part of terrorists.‖
218
 As Robert Pape demonstrates in 
data drawn from the U.S. Department of State, all suicide campaigns carried out between 
1980 and 2001 accounted for only 3% of terrorists’ activities, while still accounting for 
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48% of deaths due to terrorism.
219
 Such catastrophic effects play into modern terrorism’s 
use of psychological warfare which characterizes suicide terrorism as an effective modus 
operandi.
220
 These psychological implications are believed to serve in the interest of the 
group by compelling a target to respond or concede to an organization’s interest.
221
  Thus, 
from the perspective of the group, this effect motivates an organization to employ suicide 
terrorism as a strategic choice.  
 Being identified and remaining relevant to the international community is also 
essential to the organizations that recruit suicide bombers. The consequence of suicide 
attacks on innocent men, women and children compel the international audience to pay 
attention to such events when they are broadcasted throughout the media. Furthermore, 
the audacity of self-sacrifice compels the international community to acknowledge not 
only the organizations’ existence, but also the solemnity and legitimacy of their cause.
222
 
―Since the main effect of the violence is intended to be pressed upon an audience, the 
shocking nature of the attack is part of the calculation.‖
223
 
 Drawing from a diaspora of international support, terrorist organizations can often 
capitalize on the financial incentives behind suicide terrorism. The Shahid, or martyr, that 
carries out a suicide attack is often thought to be acting upon the interest of the nation 
he/she represents.
224
 Thus, the success of a suicide attack on a specific target fulfills the 
state and/or the organization’s political, nationalistic or separatist goal.
225
 Empathy for 
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this action is often in the form of financial incentives, sometimes reaching hundreds of 
millions of dollars, which enable future suicide attacks for a specific cause relative to the 
organization.
226
 Additionally, drawing on cost analysis, suicide terrorism is a viable 
option for organizations due to its technological simplicity of preparing or purchasing 
explosives. The variety of platforms used to transport explosives enables the use of 
technologically primitive mechanisms.
227
 On average, experts believe the economic costs 
of suicide material are about $150.
228
 Relatively speaking, measurably, the money 
invested in resources, the financial return of investment from outside donors, the coercive 
implications of concessions, and the ideological support of an organization’s cause, 
makes suicide terrorism a worthy financial motivation.  
 One aspect often agreed upon among most literature involved in the study of 
suicide terrorism is confidence in the efficiency and precision of suicide attacks by way 
of the organization. This confidence is a direct result of the operational advantages that 
suicide terrorism has. First, the limiting ability to stop a suicide bomber once he/she is 
locked in to a suicide mechanism is substantial. The bomb is essentially guaranteed to 
detonate upon target objective, capture, or by override mechanisms should a bomber 
attempt to retreat prior to mission objective.
229
 Second, the precision of suicide bombers, 
through their ability to relocate within feet of their target mitigates the opposition or 
―Western advantage of standoff targeting based on physical distance.‖
230
 Third, often the 
most complicated aspect of a terrorist attack is the escape options for the perpetrator, 
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however suicide attacks require no plan of egress.
231
 This ultimately benefits the last 
advantage of operational reasoning for suicide terrorism which is liability. The death of 
the suicide attacker eliminates the liability of intelligence gathering from oppositional 
forces.
232
 Ultimately, the operational security of the terrorist organization is secured 
through this modus operandi.
233
 This is only relevant in all cases by which the attacker 
fully executed his/her mission which ultimately resulted in their death.  
 
Case Study 
The Essence of Variation as an Analysis for Motivation 
 
The qualitative literature put forth thus far, validates the notion that suicide 
terrorism is a historic phenomenon involving different eras, players, motivations, and 
contexts, yet an event that has seen a growing appreciation for its uses. This study will 
evaluate the use of suicide terrorism through distinct groups, all representing a varied 
motivation, but apt for qualitative analysis to endure in the exploration of how 
motivations influence the group’s decision to utilize suicide terrorism as their method of 
warfare. The three groups that will be explored are the Tamil Tigers, al Qaeda and 
Hezbollah. The Tamil Tigers enable this study to establish a baseline for analyzing 
terrorist organizations’ employment of suicide terrorism as its methodology for achieving 
their cause. This organization is motivated by political and nationalistic appeals, thus 
distinguishing it from the general scope of analysis on suicide terrorism as a 
characteristic of Islamic fundamentalism. On the contrary, al Qaeda is a great example of 
this very belief, that suicide terrorism is appealing to those more closely associated to 
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extremism and Islamic fundamentalism. Hezbollah remains a center of focus in the use of 
suicide terrorism. Their employment has acted as both an influence and a strategic 
motivation for utilizing suicide attacks in their methodologies. Leadership among all 
three groups will demonstrate a solid explanation of ideological justification. Moreover, 
the operational advantages presented within each organization will be an effective 
variable in evaluating the motivations that elicit the decision to employ suicide terrorism 
as a utility of achieving respective goals.  
 
Tamil Tigers 
 The employment of suicide terrorism from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), more commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, is the central utility of political 
action adopted by its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and continued by its leadership today. 
This methodology of action is a blend of psychological manipulation that glorifies death 
and violence, at the cost of achieving a greater good for the organization, but beyond 
solely the individual consideration.
234
 The Tamil Tigers are a direct representative of the 
group dynamic explored throughout the literature presented, by which group pressure is 
essential to the motivation to carry out suicide attacks. The goals of the Tamil Tigers are 
blatant, they wish to seize control of Sri Lanka from the Sinhalese majority and create an 
independent Tamil state in the North East region of the country.
235
 Thus, their 
employment of suicide terrorism is increasingly subjected to scrutiny regarding their 
practicality of employing such a tactic to achieve their goals. Nevertheless, from the 
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1980’s to early 2000’s, the LTTE monopolized this tactic resulting in thousands of deaths 
over the course of a few decades.  In fact, by 2002 they had carried out 220 suicide 
bombings that resulted in the deaths of more than 1,500 people.  
 Suicide terrorism expert, Robert Pape, sheds light on the practicality of achieving 
political objectives through the employment of suicide attacks, by demonstrating an 
overlap of the Tamil Tigers and Hezbollah. This overlap is explicit in the first suicide 
attacks carried out by the Tamil Tigers. Reflecting many similar characteristics of 
Hezbollah’s attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, an attacker by the name of 
Captain Miller drove a truck latent with explosives into a Sinhalese barracks. Much to the 
same fashion as that carried out by Hezbollah in 1983. Although this attack did not 
translate into a political success, it did create a sense of martyrdom on Captain Miller’s 
behalf.
236
 This sense of martyrdom differs from that of Islamic organizations in that it 
does not connote the same religious implications of self-sacrifice. The Tamil Tigers are 
purely a secular group, motivated by Nationalist ideologies. They translate the concept of 
martyrdom around a secular idea of individuals that altruistically sacrifice for the greater 
good of the community.
237
 Nevertheless, the issue of practical application is central to the 
effects of suicide attacks carried out by the Tamil Tigers. Their central goal of creating a 
Tamil state and essentially seizing control of the country appears both unattainable and 
impractical utilizing a frequency of suicide attacks. Despite these concerns, suicide 
terrorism has woefully elicited a notion of fear and political willingness on behalf of the 
Tamil Tigers. Their attacks have successfully assassinated a myriad of political 
leadership including Sri Lanka Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, former Indian Prime 
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Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, and Presidential 
candidate Gamini Dissanayake. These assassinations in of itself strengthened the LTTE’s 
confidence in suicide bombings as a utility of strategic warfare. Small measures such as 
these are viewed as political successes toward achieving their ultimate goal, essentially 
compelling the organization to continue the employment of suicide terrorism. Political 
executions and the elicitation of public fears were central to the LTTE’s measurable 
variables to assess the operational effectiveness of suicide attacks.
238
 
 The LTTE views suicide terrorism as an effective military tactic aimed at 
offensive principles to counter a militarily stronger opposition. ―The main goal of the 
suicide mission was to frustrate the military and the political leadership of the enemy 
with the minimum loss of life to the perpetrators (the loss of one suicide [attacker] is 
much less than losses sustained launching a military offensive).‖
239
 This calculated 
assessment is evident in the statistics provided previously. The quantitative difference 
between casualties of the attack and the attacker themselves are a substantial difference 
that creates a worthy consideration when employing this modus operandi. The Tamil 
Tigers are a nationalist movement against an opposition which necessitates support and 
recruitment to further their cause. As such, suicide attacks act as measures of soliciting 
financial and physical support for their cause. In addition to charity related fronts that 
utilize a veil of legitimacy to collect financing for their operation as the U.S. State 
Department has claimed, the LTTE also is heavily supported by communities of Tamil 
expatriates in North American, Europe and Asia who procure weapons for and launder 
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money to the organization.
240
 This global reach is indicative of the practical application 
of brutality conveyed by the attacks, as well as the severity of their political objectives.  
 Suicide terrorists are not commoners, whose loyalty defines their right to execute 
attacks. Selected members are taken into consideration based on criteria such as 
psychological profile, suicidal ideation, group identity, and social influence.
241
 The 
perpetrators then undergo ―institutionalized indoctrination and systematic injection of 
odium with adoration of death as well as scrupulous physical training.‖
242
 This systematic 
indoctrination was strategically chosen by the Tamil Tigers leadership and one that 
proved successful throughout the years. Inevitably, all the terrorists involved in this 
process become ideologically justified in their actions. Blind obedience is not only a 
causal effect of the manipulative nature of Prabhakaran, but it was a strategic means at 
cultivating a culture of suicide terrorism as its methodology. The psychological 
motivation to kill and be killed on the individual level thus only becomes exasperated by 
the existential motivations of the group. The nationalist and political cause is central to 
the ideological motivation of suicide terrorism.  
 Perception is critical in the evaluation of the suicide attacker. Perception serves to 
justify the actions and consequences of a suicide attack. Suicide terrorists ultimately see 
the world subjectively, meaning their justification is often misconstrued by extremism 
and introversion. Ultimately, their ideological justification is based from a misinterpreted 
and manipulated faith.
243
 The Tamil Tigers are demonstrative of this manipulated 
justification. The subtle power of Prabhakaran’s manipulation created a profile of 
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himself, analogous to that of a liberator. His strict desire for Tamil sovereignty enabled 
the support of the masses. However, his decision to employ suicide attackers legitimized 
his efforts. Employing a methodology that necessitated human sacrifice for a greater 
cause beyond that individual’s life was not only seen as a response toward justification, 
but also an admiration for the veneration of death.
244
 
 Despite the ideological considerations behind the employment of suicide 
terrorism by the Tamil Tigers, quantitative analysis supports the strategic choice behind 
suicide attacks. From 1983 to 2000 alone, the Tamil Tigers accounted for 171 attacks out 
of a possible 308 attacks worldwide. The utilization of this method was perfected by the 
Tamil Tigers and inevitably inspired its inscription into many other terrorist organizations 
decision to employ suicide terrorism. The logistical inability for counter operations to 
prevent and cease a suicide attack is valuable to the success of this methodology. 
Inevitably, the success of a suicide attack is only dependent upon the attacker arming 
themselves with a mechanism for causing damage. From that point forward the attack 
remains imminent, with the specific target being the last goal for mission objective. 
Mishaps along the way are possible, however the likelihood of casualties regardless of 
the inclusion of a particular target still remains possible. The assassination of high level 
targets has solidified the strategic means for employing suicide terrorism as a significant 
pay off. The Tamil Tigers have been successful in assassinating former Indian Prime 
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and the President of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa. The 
operational advantages thus outweigh other methodologies of terrorism, validating the 
motivation for its employment by the Tamil Tigers.  
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Jihad as a Foundation for Suicide Attacks 
 
This study validates the prevalence of the employment of suicide terrorism by 
non-secular groups like al Qaeda and Hezbollah, but understanding Jihad as a foundation 
for suicide attacks is paramount to the scope of this evaluation. Certainly, in cases such as 
the Tamil Tigers, religion is separated from the concept of suicide attacks, but political 
and religious context within Middle Eastern organizations necessitate a thorough 
understanding of the relationship of suicide terrorism and religion. Undoubtedly, it is apt 
to suggest that literature focused on ―history of exploitation by Western powers, Israel’s 
existence, government oppression, poverty, lack of education, and alienation‖ are valid in 
their attempt to explain motivations behind suicide terrorism.
245
 Nevertheless, it is 
academic negligence to disregard the relationship of religion and suicide terrorism in 
consideration of non-secular organizations like Hezbollah and al Qaeda. This study offers 
a unique opportunity to evaluate the individual and group aspect in correlation with 
motivations behind suicide terrorism. More specifically, individual justification as a 
platform for the group objective is significant to understanding the motivations that 
influence an organization’s decision to employ suicide terrorism as their modus operandi.  
 Despite existing scholarship and the various degrees of interpreting the term 
Jihad, there is no contention that Jihad is synonymous with war.
246
 The ideological 
interpretation has been contested throughout a course of history, but its modern presence 
came about as a result of interpretations from Muslim Brotherhood theorists Sayyid Qutb 
and Hasan al-Banna. Despite the exegesis developing out of Sunni jurisprudence, the 
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Islamic Republic of Iran and their proxy groups like Hezbollah, adopted the interpretation 
and employed Jihad as their justification for suicide terrorism.
247
  
 Although as literature connotes, Jihad is regarded in terms of the inner struggle, 
many theologians refer to this interpretation in a military sense.
248
 Understanding Jihad is 
thus integral to understanding the justification behind employing suicide terrorism. 
Islamic jurisprudence is distinguished in four ways by which an individual can fulfill 
their Jihad obligations: faith in their heart, preaching the word, by carrying out good 
deeds with their hand and by confronting unbelievers with the sword.
249
 The explicit 
synthesis of non-violent and violent means enables a military influence to Jihad and thus, 
constitutes a legitimate justification for employing violent actions to achieve religious 
obligations. Jihad’s objective is not so complex, as it seeks ―to establish God’s rule on 
earth by compelling non-Muslims to embrace Islam, or to force them to accept second 
class status if not eradicate them altogether.‖
250
 Martyrdom thus, enables Muslims to 
fulfill their religious obligations based on these interpretations of Jihad. The martyr acts 
as the platform for Jihad, killed by their own hand, but at the mercy of a greater 
obligation, the ideological duties presented by Jihad. Such sacrifice entitles special status 
in paradise upon Judgment Day.
251
 Suicide terrorism, in the context of organizations like 
al Qaeda and Hezbollah, consequently is justified under these tenants of Islam. The 
variability of the political and religious goals among al Qaeda and Hezbollah will remain 
diverse, but the general application of Jihad will constitute a legitimate basis for 
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understanding how motivations influence the decision for terrorist organizations to 
employ suicide terrorism as their modus operandi.  
Al-Qaeda 
General perception of al Qaeda finds that Islamic fundamentalism is at the heart 
of their influences to any attack or action the organization takes. Many scholars suggest 
that members of al Qaeda are considered religious fanatics who employ suicide terrorism 
because they are illogical, but the leadership of the organization plays a much greater role 
in the motivation for employing suicide attacks. This counteracts the claim of irrational 
actors by justifying the rationality of the decision to carry out suicide attacks. Islamic 
fundamentalism is critical in the evaluation of motivations, however the context of 
political and religious justification for such attacks is essential in this case. Evaluations of 
suicide terrorism must consider the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim 
attackers, like the Tamil Tigers, for purposes of distinguishing religious components of 
suicide terrorism.
252
 All Muslim attackers justify their actions based on an ideological 
influence and the concept of Jihad.
253
 
The indoctrination of a suicide terrorist is similar to that of one employed by the 
Tamil Tigers. Most attackers are motivated on a personal level by the adoration of 
revenge or resentment toward an enemy. The group acts to channel that motivation and 
utilize it in a suicide attack that fulfills the group cause and the individual desire. 
Nevertheless, in order to understand the motivations of al Qaeda this study must explore 
the ideological justifications that compel the use of suicide terrorism as discussed in the 
previous section regarding Jihad. Robert Pape addresses suicide terrorism as a logical 
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methodology with considerable success at achieving a realistic goal that other methods 
have failed, such as the liberation of occupied territory being one.
254
 Suicide terrorism is 
a strategic consideration with a psychological means of justifying its employment. This 
psychological consideration will be discussed in chapter three. The symbiotic relationship 
in the terrorist decision making process is exemplified through the use of suicide 
terrorism as an organization’s modus operandi.  
 The Sunni influence is instrumental in the evaluation of suicide terrorism as a 
methodology of al Qaeda. This comes as a result of the religious justification interpreted 
through suicide terrorism as an honorable response to Jihad. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, ―is 
credited with being the first Sunni Islamic figure to instill the Islamic community with a 
divine myth of invincibility of Jihad and terrorism.‖
255
 This individual was influenced by 
several Islamic scholars before his time that laid out the groundwork for Islamic 
fundamentalism, ultimately becoming a major ideological influence on Osama Bin 
Laden. Al Qaeda’s leadership ultimately justified suicide terrorism as its methodology 
through their interpretation of Jihad.  
 Evaluating the motivations that influence the decision to employ suicide terrorism 
thus necessitates a scope into the idea of operational effectiveness. Assessing al Qaeda’s 
goals in retrospect of the success of suicide attacks will divulge an understanding of why 
suicide terrorism is a utility worth employing. Although al Qaeda’s goals are broad, they 
are strategically stated as such as a means to translate their strategies as a success in 
regards to achieving their stated goals.  
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 Al Qaeda undoubtedly seeks to spread Islam throughout the world and they are 
capable of doing so from their name and brand alone. The mention of this organization 
conjures images of terror, network, efficiency and brutality.
256
 Spreading Islam includes 
the recruitment and support objectives of al Qaeda also. The concept of al Qaeda alone, 
with Islam as its foundation of beliefs, enabled the organization to prosper not only in the 
Middle East, but throughout the world. According to the Foreign Policy Journal by a 
study sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, statistics ardently 
demonstrate that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world.
257
 From 1990 to 2010, 
the global Muslim population increased by an annual average of 2.2%.
258
 Furthermore, 
from 2010 to 2020, the growth of Islam is expected to increase by 1.70%.
259
 Lastly, by 
2030 Muslims are expected to represent 26.4% of the global population.
260
   The logical 
assertion from a reasonable individual will thus argue that the spread of this religion is 
one of peaceful means, as opposed to extremist Islam like that represented by al Qaeda. 
While this notion perhaps holds true, it would be erroneous to assume that al Qaeda 
leadership would not manipulate such statistics to represent their role in the spread of 
Islam. Extremist or not, the ability to manipulate data of these measures is idiosyncratic 
of al Qaeda leadership. Thus, assessing these statistics is necessary to this study. Statistics 
have shown that Islam is spreading more rapidly than any other religion and the al Qaeda 
worldview has grown in a similar fashion. This radical internationalist ideology, 
sustained by anti-Western rhetoric has contributed to al Qaeda’s objectives of not only 
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spreading Islam, but also contributing to their support and recruitment goals.
261
 Although 
its adherents may not be directly linked to the organization, ―they merely, follow his 
precepts, models, and methods. They act in the style of al Qaeda, but they are only part of 
al Qaeda in the loosest sense.‖
262
  
 Al Qaeda understands their subservient role against a more powerful, formidable, 
and technologically sound opposition. Thus, their decision to employ suicide terrorist is a 
strategy intended to delineate the inequality of fighting prowess. Moreover, this decision 
alludes to al Qaeda’s principal objective of carrying out damaging strikes against the 
United States in retaliation for its perceived aggression in the Islamic world.
263
  As 
mentioned previously, suicide terrorism is beneficial for a quantity of reasons. It is 
unpredictable and capable of achieving its target at point blank range due to the 
individual acting as the platform of execution. It is theatrical, benefitting the emission of 
terror aspect of the attack in regards to media. Lastly, it connotes the severity of political 
implications behind the attacks because it requires the end of one’s life for success of the 
suicide attack. These reasons compel the rational decision to employ suicide terrorism 
from al Qaeda’s leadership. Suicide attacks including those on September 11, 2001 have 
been al Qaeda’s claim to fame. They strategically execute such operations in a fashion 
that can both truly recruit the extremist supporters of Islam, and manipulate the increase 
in Islamic supporters around the world as a success due to their operations. Nevertheless, 
what cannot be attested is the fact that al Qaeda has grown tremendously in terms of 
regional affiliates.  
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 ―According to U. S. officials, al Qaeda cells and associates are located in over 70 
countries.‖
264
 A report conducted by the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) has 
shown a significant increase in suicide attacks since 2000, with 2013 showing an even 
larger increase over the other years.
265
 Since 2000, an estimated 3,500 suicide attacks 
have taken place, however September 11, 2001 revealed the point at which al Qaeda was 
responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks taken place around the world.
266
 As of 
2013, more than 95 percent of suicide attacks were carried out by al Qaeda, its affiliates, 
and sympathizers who are more loosely associated with the organization, but inspired by 
their goals.
267
 This method provides incentives for terrorist organizations to employ this 
utility as a result of being motivated by the number of lives these attacks claim and the 
effects on public morale. The INSS study conclusively found that in 2013, terrorist 
organizations carried out 291 suicide attacks in 18 different countries, resulting in the 
death of 3,100 people.
268
 This statistic alone is demonstrative of a 25% increase in suicide 
attacks over two years alone.
269
 These statistics provide valuable insight into the 
correlation of suicide attacks with the success of al Qaeda. They have increased their 
Islamic followers through such a methodology, while also spreading their brand.  
As of April 25, 2014 the leader of al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, insisted that al 
Qaeda is holding strong and has expanded since the War on Terror following the attacks 
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 This conclusively supports their objectives of spreading Islam and continuing 
to fight the Western influence including the United States. Al Zawahiri claims, ―the upper 
hand is for the one who does not withdraw from his land. Who has withdrawn from Iraq, 
and who has not? Who has withdrawn from Afghanistan and who has not?‖
271
 He makes 
these references in a video sought for recruitment purposes and in reference to the United 
States military withdraw from each country. Supported empirically by the statistics 
claimed previously and in conjunction with claims such as these, suicide terrorism has 
undeniably translated into success in the perspective of al Qaeda leadership. The 
relationship between such variables offers the opportunity to understand the motivations 
that influence the decision to employ suicide terrorism. 
Hezbollah 
Hezbollah’s employment of suicide bombing is a militarily effective, 
theologically justified means to achieve political ends.
272
 Central to the ideological 
justification of Hezbollah’s employment of suicide terrorism is the understanding that 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini thoroughly entertained the words of Islamist thinkers 
before him. Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb thoroughly 
addressed the centrality of Jihad, consequently enabling external interpretation to justify 
the use of suicide terrorism as an obligation to Jihad.
273
 Martyrdom is revered as the 
highest form of honor for a Muslim and thus, death in battle is supported by actions of 
suicide attacks. Ayatollah Khomeini is recorded as claiming that ―the purest joy in Islam 
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is to kill and be killed for Allah.‖
274
 This is bearing in mind that Hezbollah’s attacks are 
all supported by the notion of Jihad. The assumption of suicide attacks as an illogical 
response by religious fanatics is disingenuous to the understanding of an extreme 
interpretation of Jihad as Hezbollah has taken on.  
As an evaluation of due diligence in regards to the notion of Jihad, it must be 
known that Muslim opposition beliefs are apologetic to the use of suicide terrorism, 
claiming them haram or sinful as interpreted in the Hadith that opposes killing oneself. A 
Lebanese Shia cleric supports this claim in a fatwa that which purports suicide as haram 
according to Islamic law.
275
 Despite these Muslim oppositions, the ideological motivation 
is supported by the meaning of martyrdom. Ultimately, suicide terrorism is not suicide 
because it is carried out under the guise of Jihad. Muslim interpretation of the Holy War 
ultimately compels suicide terrorism to be casted in the light of the ultimate honor. This 
concept was more thoroughly explored previously and is imperative in the discussion of 
Hezbollah as an employer of suicide terrorism. Nevertheless, despite justifying 
Hezbollah’s decision to employ suicide terrorism, it is necessary to discuss their goals in 
order to understand the operational effectiveness of suicide attacks. This will enable an 
effective metric to more thoroughly assess the correlation of suicide attacks with success 
in achieving their political objectives.  
Some of Hezbollah’s major goals are as follows: to fight against and end Israel 
and to counteract their conjectural sense of invincibility, to become the voice of Lebanon, 
and to establish an Islamic government in Lebanon.
276
 Subsequently, the effects of 
suicide attacks are worthy of achieving Hezbollah’s major goals, within justification by 
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religious doctrine. Suicide attacks are a strategic tactic used against a militarily superior 
opposition, a tactic used to even the playing field if you will. Suicide attacks are 
unpredictable, accurate, cost effective, brutally theatrical and worthy of eliciting true 
terror within the opposition. Lastly, suicide terrorism is a tactic that compels society to 
legitimize the seriousness of the political objectives of an organization that is willing to 
employ suicide attacks within their modus operandi. ―With a thoughtful understanding of 
the capabilities of this weapon and the political goals it might help to attain, Hezbollah 
carefully timed suicide bombing operations to make their enemies pay significant 
military and political costs.‖
277
 From the 1980’s, when suicide bombing first emerged a 
public spectacle, until 2000, most of approximately 200 such bombings were carried out 
by Hezbollah.
278
 Hezbollah leadership, beginning with its founder Abbas Mussawi, to 
today emphasized the political goals of the organization, though hidden within the 
language of Islam, to remove the current power in Lebanon and expel foreign powers 
from the country. Thus, employing suicide bombing was a practical decision employed as 
a means of raising arms, while aimed at a political objective. ―Hezbollah demonstrated 
military pragmatism by using what worked and discarding what did not.‖
279
 Recognition 
of inadequacies of military might against a more formidable opposition, nurtured the 
notion of asymmetrical warfare, namely the suicide bomber. As Daniel Helmer points out 
in his dissertation, a United Nations spokesman is quoted as identifying Hezbollah as one 
of the few organizations to utilize a review process within their decision to employ 
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military tactics aimed at achieving their political objectives, going on to state ―these guys 
learn from their mistakes.‖
280
  
Hezbollah’s decision to employ suicide terrorism was one drawn from a practical 
standpoint. They utilized other forms of military tactics including, conventional warfare, 
rifle vs. rifle, ambushes, and grenade attacks to name a few, however the military value 
found in suicide attacks compelled the organization to make a practical decision to 
employ this tactic based on the value and practicality of its implications.
281
 The accuracy, 
precision, maximizing effects and absence of an alias, were all calculated variables that 
Hezbollah reviewed and determined to provide the most value in regards to military 
tactics. A suicide attack can move as close to a target as possible, casualties can be 




The military advantages that suicide attacks carry enable a more formidable 
opportunity for Hezbollah to achieve its political goals mentioned previously, versus a 
more conventional approach to warfare. Various events have supported these claims. An 
April 1983 initiative by the United States and Israel to broker a Lebanese-Israeli peace 
treaty was antithetical to Hezbollah’s ideology.
283
 Thus, on April 18, 1983 Hezbollah 
carried out an attack on the U.S. embassy in Lebanon killing 63, including 17 Americans. 
The treaty that was originally thought to be signed quickly, was delayed by negotiation 
complications and Lebanese parliament delays.
284
 In a response to continued foreign 
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military presence by the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon, Hezbollah carried out 
double suicide bombings on October 23, 1983 against the American Marine barracks and 
French compound, killing 299 American and French forces. Continued threats aimed at 
compelling the Multinational Force to leave Lebanon was a calculated decision intended 
to undermine public support in the United States and other nations associated with the 
MNF.
285
 The Multination Force withdrew from Lebanon in March of 1984, shortly after 
the attack on the barracks, prompting Hezbollah’s view as a successful calculation in 
carrying out their suicide attacks. On November 4, 1983 Hezbollah attacked the Israeli 
security services base in Tyre. The blatant attack that followed the public warning of an 
imminent attack, unsettled Israeli civilians who began to question the Israeli Defense 
Force’s ability to protect them.
286
 Recommendations by the Tyre Commission following 
the attacks suggested Israeli forces move out of populated cities in the hopes that 
Hezbollah would move freely among the populace and limit collateral damage to civilian 
bystanders when attacks were carried out against Israeli forces.
287
 The decision to 
withdraw forces was a success by Hezbollah’s standards in its own right because it 
reduced the Israeli forces’ influence over the civilian populace.
288
 By 1985 Hezbollah 
viewed their employment of suicide attacks a success, due large in part to the subsequent 
withdrawal of the Multinational Force in Lebanon and the Israeli Defense Force’s 
withdrawal from Beirut.  
Despite these attacks Hezbollah uses suicide attacks in a calculated fashion. 
Consensus within the organization’s leadership believed that ―suicide operations should 
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only be carried out if they can bring about a political or military change proportional to 
the passions that incite a person to make of his body an explosive bomb.‖
289
 They 
believed that if the attacks stopped causing casualties and yielding political and military 
benefits, then it would be unlikely that a willing corps of prospective suicide bombers 
would exist.
290
 Hezbollah substantiated the correlation between suicide attacks and their 
frequency by conveying and publically claiming success in achieving the political 
objectives of the group. This enables an invaluable scope of measuring operational 
effectiveness to determine how motivations influence the decision to employ suicide 
terrorism as their modus operandi.  
 
Conclusion 
Exploring the issue of what motivates an organization to employ suicide terrorism 
as their modus operandi, necessitates an in depth discussion of several variables that 
contribute to the study. Although current discussions often focus on whether it is logical 
or illogical to utilize suicide terrorism, it is often trivial. Reasonableness will undoubtedly 
be discussed for years to come, but understanding motivations provide a more tangible 
variable to the study. Literature is often dominated by the evaluation of two categories 
that suicide attackers belong to: the individual and the group. Despite the separation of 
the two categories, they are very much related as a result of the group influence. While 
individuals characteristically embody many qualities of a suicide victim in general, they 
are often influenced by the group dynamic and consequently, act as the platform for 
carrying out a suicide attack. As was demonstrated throughout this paper, despite a 
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general belief among society and scholars alike, suicide terrorism is not rooted purely 
from fanaticism. Although it is an influence, the decision to employ this method is often 
times a calculated move and intended as a strategic tactic often against a militarily 
stronger opposition. Nevertheless, within Islamic extremist organizations such as 
Hezbollah and al Qaeda, religion acts as the outlier of justification to carry out such an 
attack. The religious obligation to Jihad by a suicide attacker is often supported and 
applied as a means of justifying an attack, thus creating an honor of martyrdom. 
Although, religion acts as a means of justification, the strategic application of suicide 
terrorism within an organizations’ modus operandi involves significant calculations based 
on operational effectiveness.  The motivations are dependent upon the context, meaning 
ideological justification, operational advantage and political motivations behind the 
attacks. Thus, the complete eradication of suicide terrorism is unlikely. It has been 
historically proven to pay off for both the individual and group motivation and as this 
study demonstrated, there is logic and strategic value through its employment.  
Evaluating organizations that employ suicide attacks, enables an opportunity to 
measure political objectives against the frequency and effectiveness of such attacks, in an 
effort to determine how motivations influence the decision to utilize suicide terrorism.  
That being said, the case studies of the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah and al Qaeda, all 
organizations that employ suicide terrorism, convey a historical account which highlights 
the security and political environment as a significant variable in evaluating suicide 
attacks.  The latter meaning, issues of the political state of affairs within each 
organization, often determine the likelihood and frequency of suicide attacks. It remains a 
logical consideration that future terrorist organizations’ examination of cost-benefit 
90 
 
analysis will in fact strengthen the desire to employ suicide terrorism as their modus 
operandi against a more globalized and formidable opposition. Furthermore, their vast 
external support network will enable them to continue this tactic, as was alluded to in 
chapter one. Both historically and today, global patterns around the world often support 
this notion. As of 2002 there were 50 suicide attacks around the world. In 2008, more 
than 500 suicide attacks were carried out around the world.
291
 Regional and political 
evaluations on these figures have a common denominator of foreign occupation 
throughout the Middle East as a variable worth considering. Issues such as these provide 
an opportunity to evaluate how motivations influence the decision for terrorist 
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Terrorist Groups Utilize Military Interventions to Spread their Cause 
Throughout the Middle East and Africa, military intervention by Western states 
seeks to prevent the spread of terrorism. However, terrorist organizations like al Qaeda 
and its affiliate, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) use these interventions to 
further their cause by manipulating essential regional factors like religious belief, social 
and cultural traditions. Al Qaeda and AQIM use these tactics to gain popular support or 
sympathy for their cause by activating nationalist reactions. Understanding how terrorist 
organizations use military interventions to spread terrorism involves fundamental 
considerations. That being, the way in which terrorist organizations conduct themselves 
and the efforts they take to promote the spread of their ideology and methods.  This 
chapter will seek to argue that to be successful, military interventions must be sensitive to 
regional conditions meaning religious beliefs, and social and cultural traditions of the 
population. The first instance by which that sensitivity is breached is the moment by 
which terrorist organizations capitalize and exploit the intention of the military 
intervention as self-indulged.  The spread of terrorism is often the result of narrative and 
ideological manipulation by terrorist organizations. Moreover, their unique ability to 
demonize military intervention as the enemy of a native population is paramount to an 
organizations support and recruitment capabilities. Utilizing the relevant theories 
espoused throughout the literature review, this chapter will hypothesize that terrorist 
organizations utilize military intervention to spread terrorism by manipulating the 
spiritual identity of the host nation as relatable only to the organization, as well as by 
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identifying and exaggerating the disconnect between social and cultural traditions of the 
intervening force and host nation.  
This chapter will demonstrate that terrorist organizations’ ability to manipulate 
the intentions of military interventions can strategically intensify their agenda. 
Interventions are used by terrorist groups to perpetuate a narrative, a phenomenon that 
Western states have historically struggled to combat, while simultaneously contesting 
terrorist groups. This chapter will examine whether the way in which military 
interventions treat regional factors such as cultural, social, and religious traditions 
benefits the intervened population and thus, contains the spread of terrorism throughout 
the region or not. This consideration is necessary in examining the influence terrorist 
organizations have on these factors and the extent by which they will exploit these 
regional elements to further their cause and increasingly spread terror. Consideration of 
message content, recruitment and the manipulation of narrative will all be vital in 
understanding how terrorist organizations influence the affects of military intervention on 
the spread of terrorism.  
            The argument will proceed as follows. I will first define what is meant by military 
intervention and the spread of terrorism. To analyze how terrorist organizations use 
interventions to further their cause, the paper will examine scholarly literature on the role 
of the following regional conditions: religious belief, social and cultural traditions and the 
perception of a common threat from the intervened population. This literature review is 
essential in conceptualizing the essence of these regional conditions because they are 
historically a determinant of success for military intervention.  The methodology in the 
subsequent section will examine how terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and AQIM 
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exploit those factors, focusing on their ability to manipulate narrative and garner support 
from the population, in an effort to discredit an intervening force. Doing so, is a method 
to facilitate recruitment and support, thus spreading terrorism. This chapter will conclude 
by evaluating a case study of American military intervention in Afghanistan between 
2001 and 2012. It will focus on the extent at which American forces acknowledged and 
considered the aforementioned regional factors and the way by which terrorist 
organizations have exploited that sensitivity to further their cause. Additionally, a case 
study on the Franco-African military intervention in Mali in the early months of 2013 
will examine the conduct of the military intervention and the failures of AQIM to exploit 
their intentions. The results of these case studies will provide an analysis of the role of 
the essential regional factors and the implications on the spread of terrorism and the level 
of success of military interventions.  
 Defining the Concepts 
 To better understand the scope of this chapter it is paramount to define clearly 
what is meant by military intervention and the spread of terrorism. These two concepts 
are fundamental to understanding the process by which intervening forces and terrorist 
organizations can dissuade or exacerbate regional terror. Moreover, any reference to 
AQIM is meant to be restricted to its role in the geographic regions of North Africa and 
the Horn of Africa all inclusive of Mali, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria and Somalia.  
 For purposes of this study, referring to Pearson and Baumann’s International 
Military Intervention (IMI) dataset is most appropriate to comprehending the argument at 
stake. These researchers contend that military intervention refers to the physical 
movement of forces of one nation state into another country. This movement is 
94 
 
understood to be acted on by the intervening force either by acceptance from the 
intervened state, or by force from the intervening troops.
292
 These intentions are meant 
for security implications ―to prevent the occupied country from becoming a threat to the 
occupying power or other states and to ensure that the occupied territory does not become 
a destabilizing influence in the region‖.
293
 Furthermore, the definitions offered by 
Pickering and Kisangani, constrain this definition by stating ―paramilitaries, government 
backed militias, private security forces, and other military units that are not part of the 
uniformed military of the state are excluded.
294
 This study will exclude eight of the nine 
motivating factors that initiate military intervention stated in the IMI and refer only to 
―rebel pursuit issues‖ which refer to incidences involving the ―pursuit of rebel or terrorist 
forces across borders‖.
295
 This chapter will focus on this one motivating factor to 
distinguish between humanitarian intervention and military intervention. Terrorist 
organizations perceive the nature of the intervention by military forces as an infringement 
on their religious, social and cultural beliefs as Muslims. Constraining the definition of 
military intervention to this scope will allow this study to focus on how al Qaeda and its 
affiliates use military interventions to further their cause and spread terrorism.  
 What is meant by the spread of terrorism? For the purposes of this argument we 
will refer to the meaning offered by Seung Choi who cites LaFree and Dugan’s 
explanation defining terrorism as ―an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a 
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non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal‖.
296
 The spread of 
terrorism thus, is the movement through ideological means and the physical recruitment 
by terrorist organizations on the population of an intervened state to influence violence 
and threats for a specific goal important to that organization.
297
 This spread does not 
necessitate the crossing of borders, though it is implied, but also incorporates the diaspora 
of terrorist ideology from within a country’s border to its citizens that previously had no 
affiliation with the terrorist organization.
298
 The concept of the spread of terrorism from 
the perspective of an intervening force is not the same to a terrorist organization. 
Terrorist organizations do not tend to see themselves as terrorists. Rather, their role in a 
target population is necessary to ―advance their cause and agenda in the name of which 





Religious Beliefs  
 The respect and acknowledgement of religious beliefs in a foreign land from 
intervening forces is integral to the native populace. For purposes of this chapter, I will 
focus on Islamic beliefs as a popular religious practice throughout Africa and the Middle 
East, namely in locations heavily dominated by al Qaeda affiliates. Religion is one 
avenue or pathway through which a terrorist organization can use, exploit, or capitalize 
on a military intervention in order to gain popular support or sympathy for itself. They do 
this by utilizing religion-based messages and arguments, and by activating religious 
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symbolism. Perception is the tool that terrorist organizations utilize to manipulate the 
intentions of military interventions. Demonizing military interventions garners support 
from the native populations in favor of terrorist organizations. Religion essentially acts as 
a tool for manipulation for terrorist organizations. Identifying differences in spiritual 
identity between an intervening force and the indigenous of the host nation enables 
terrorist organizations to gain popular support and sympathy for their cause. In doing so, 
terrorist organizations ultimately disassociate the population from an intervening force 
through the use of religion as a weapon. This substantiates the argument at the heart of 
this chapter. The literature shows that religion as an essential regional consideration can 
be utilized as a weapon of manipulation in the event that a disconnect is espoused.  
Respecting religious beliefs is an implication meaningful beyond ideological 
aspects. The weight of such implications is enough to cross borders and boundaries, 
infiltrate societies and create a unified belief that the purposes of military intervention to 
contain the emerging threats posed by terrorist organizations are a unified necessity for 
the intervened population and international community. To that effect, recognition of 
religious importance must be thoroughly understood and respected by intervening forces. 
Terrorist organizations have utilized their understanding of religion to cast a common 
relationship between them and the native population. Gallup polls measuring importance 
of religion document an average of 94.5 percent of people prioritize religion amongst 
countries relevant in this study including Somalia, Mali, Eritrea, and Libya
300
. 
Consequently, perceiving military intervention as either agreeable or disagreeable of 
religious beliefs is pertinent in the causal relationship affecting the spread of terrorism. 
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Each scenario taking shape is worthy of possibly deterring or dissuading the spread of 
terrorism or igniting religious sentiment in spreading terrorism throughout the Africa.  
Scholarship on the internal organization of religiously motivated groups 
demonstrates that the tactic of utilizing religion as a form of manipulation is integral.
301
 
―The internal logic and social foundations of religious extremism are much the same, 
whether the extremists’ goals are good, bad, or deadly.‖
302
 Understanding that terrorist 
organizations have logic behind manipulating religions to further their goals assumes 
difficulty in achieving success when military interventions are carried out by Western 
states. The dissimilarity of religion makes it difficult to establish a credible relationship 
between the native population and intervening forces. ―The effects of government 
interventions are, if anything, more pernicious in the realm of religion…To combat 
extremism with the powers of the state is to invite conflict if that extremism represents a 
widespread unmet demand for some set of services.‖
303
 Perception ultimately becomes a 
tool of manipulation. The ability to manipulate religion as mutual between terrorist 
organizations and native populations allows for easier channels of success in promoting 
their agendas. Conversely, portraying military interventions as at odds with the native 
people increases chances of resistance. A society driven by resistance and incited by an 
occupying terrorist organization decreases the likelihood of a successful military 
intervention. The aforementioned remains a vulnerability of the literature however. 
Consensus amongst the literature explored, there is an underlying assumption that 
Western states are too different to relate and appreciate religious beliefs, traditions and 
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implications. There remains a void in literature that explores this assumption, however by 
the very nature of an absence in this topic it is logical to conclude that assumptions of this 
significance can alter this course of a study. Nevertheless, the study will proceed utilizing 
the literature at hand, while giving credence to the possibility that evidence addressing 
that assumption can in the future, alter this study.   
The 2012 Quran burning in Afghanistan is one example of an erroneous decision 
by American forces in Afghanistan, which enabled promotional narrative by al Qaeda’s 
recruitment wing. ―The Quran burning is a telling metaphor for the instances of flawed 
Western diplomacy, consisting of military intervention…To burn the most holy scripture 
of a culture is the most delegitimizing acknowledgement of bad motives and 
intentions‖.
304
 The failure of intervening forces respecting Islamic practices acted as a 
catalyst for terrorist organizations’ manipulation of religious considerations. Al Shabaab 
in Somalia grasped the opportunity to promote their agenda as one in accordance with the 
Somali people, casting a dark shadow on military intervention. They organized a protest 
rally attended by thousands of men, women and children. Furthermore, one of the group’s 
leaders Sheikh Ali Mohamoud Rage called out to all Muslims claiming ―The Americans 
are trying to hide these evil acts from the public, but we know and saw what they did. 
This will draw immediate retaliation from the billions of Muslims around the world.‖
305
  
To this degree, perception is most significant as it appears to the intervened population. 
The events that took place at Abu Ghraib prison in which prisoners were photographed in 
dehumanizing, torturous and religiously symbolic disregard became an immense 
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narrative of recruitment for terrorist organizations.
306
 ―The chilling images of detainee 
abuse at Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison—especially the iconic figure of a hooded man 
connected to electrical wires; of Private Lynndie England posing in front of a line of 
naked men, cigarette dangling from her mouth, her finger pointed towards the genitals of 
naked victims—infuriated Muslims around the world and rallied Arab sentiment to the 
cause of Islamic extremism.‖
307
 Strategically, terrorist organizations rallied behind this 
error. They capitalized and cast the Americans in a limelight contrary to all Muslims. The 
―Americans are corrupt, heartless, and hell-bent on humiliating Muslims and mocking 
their values. Apt to this error, Hamm quotes one military researcher as saying, ―If Osama 
bin Laden had hired a Madison Avenue public relations firm to rally Arabs’ hearts and 
minds to his cause, it’s hard to imagine that it could have devised a better propaganda 
campaign‖.
308
 The threat of religious disrespect had consequences following this 
incidence however. Just ―four days after the Abu Ghraib photos were released the 
terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi beheaded a 26-year-old Jewish businessman from 
Philadelphia named Nicholas Berg and broadcast the gruesome event on an Islamic 
militant Web site, prefacing the decapitation with a statement about the torture 
scandal.‖
309
 The implications of the conduct by which military interventions handle 
religion carry genuine meaning. Religion in this instance was not only a path, but a 
movement that enabled support for al Qaeda’s agenda.  
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Social and Cultural Perceptions 
 In addition to religion, terrorist organizations cast themselves as a benefit to 
native social and cultural structures. The way in which they project themselves as a 
benefit to a native society is another avenue by which terrorist organizations garner 
support. The opportunity of manipulation by terrorist organizations to view military 
intervention as a tool of reform on traditional structures in society is endless and thus 
jeopardizes an intervening forces ability to discredit or dissuade the spread of terrorism. 
Therefore, efforts to convey military intervention as at odds with what a native society 
needs are a strategic calculation aimed at garnering resistance, support and recruitment. 
The ability to instigate and compel a society to adopt tactics of violent resistance often 
emanates in the form of terrorism.
310
 Although not conceived by outside perspective, 
acting with violence is a tool of indoctrinating a sense of national defense against 
intervening forces.
311
 Convincing an intervened society that military intervention is an 
infringement on status quo social structures necessitates manipulating their narrative.  
Additionally, terrorist organizations often capitalize on regional necessities of a native 
population. Their promise to provide the necessities for societies is a political calculation 
aimed at promoting their agenda. The elicitation of nationalist reactions is significant for 
terrorist organizations to perceive military interventions as a threat to society. This also 
acts as support to the argument presented in the first chapter which states that terrorist 
organizations seek to elicit nationalist reactions as a means of garnering popular support.  
 Al Qaeda and its affiliates, such as AQIM, are duly influenced by common 
beliefs.  One such belief is that Western presence in the Middle East and Africa is often 
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the blame for attacks carried out by terrorist organizations. The way in which intervening 
forces handle cultures and values carry distinct significance. A recent spike in ―green on 
blue‖ attacks in which Afghan Security forces injure or kill their Western allies have 
demonstrated the disconnect between military intervention and social and cultural 
structures of intervened societies. One such attacker, Sammarudin, has been hailed as a 
hero for the attacks in which he killed two US soldiers for their blatant ―disrespect for the 
Afghan culture and Islamic values‖ (BBC News). Sammarudin’s grave has become a 
shrine and a pilgrimage for those wishing to join the resistance against US and NATO 
forces in Afghanistan. Such instances of resistance have become fundamental in the 
narrative portrayed by al Qaeda. Resistance like this enables societies to sympathize with 
terrorist organizations that demonize intervening forces.  
Exploitation and Manipulation Tactics Aimed at Spreading Terror 
The relationship between terrorist organizations and societies is unique, 
depending on the fundamental factors which shape a populace and guide their beliefs in 
religion, social and cultural traditions. Moreover, the ability to interpret military 
intervention and manipulate its intentions is paramount to terrorist organizations success 
in recruitment, narrative expression and ultimately, the spread of terrorism.  
 Religious belief is often that which guides human existence in Muslim 
communities and Islamic believer in general. These beliefs ―further serve to facilitate 
cooperation by altering the perceived payoff of costly actions‖ including terrorism.
312
 As 
Pape demonstrates, terrorism motivated by religion accounts for only 3% of terrorist 
activity from 1980 to 2003, however the same motivation accounts for 48% of fatalities 
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as a consequence of terrorist activity.
313
 Although the motivation accounts for so little 
terrorist activity, the effects of this motivation are devastating enough to create a theatre 
of significance through religious symbolism. Although this figure is a mere 
representation of terrorism in general, it likewise is a depiction of the affect religion and 
terrorism play throughout Africa. ―Religion is not the root cause of conflicts, but is rather 
a tool used by terrorists to achieve their goals.‖
314
  
 Al Qaeda and AQIM have successfully infiltrated societies torn by political and 
economic strife such as Mali and Afghanistan and manipulated religious belief to convey 
the perception that the populace would be ―participating in something of divine 
significance that transcends individual self-interest.‖
315
 Leaders of terrorist organizations 
understand the importance of converting their cause to one that is relatable and beneficial 
to society as a whole.  This tool of manipulation is imperative in the fight against military 
intervention. Religious belief is significant because it becomes a means to an end; it is the 
driver and influencer of life’s decisions among Muslims. Thus, by manipulating military 
intervention as not in touch with divine significance and intended for national interests 
dispels distrust among the intervened population and their perception toward military 
intervention.  
 Al Qaeda and AQIM are consistent in demonizing intervening forces such as 
French, American, Ethiopian, and Nigerian troops as at odds with Muslim beliefs. By 
demonizing intervening forces, terrorist organizations portray them as a common threat to 
themselves and the native population. The common threat is ultimately portrayed as the 
demon. The glorified hand which guides societies, facilitates and abides by religious 
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belief is that which is most relatable to the common people, one of your own if you will. 
This protagonist seeks not to garner the interests of the state, but rather, the interest of the 
people. The ability of terrorist organizations to comprehend the latter and manipulate 
intervening forces as at odds with the people is what makes the relationship between 
them and religious belief fundamental to understanding the affects of military 
intervention on the spread of terrorism.  
Manipulation for Recruitment and Support 
 Often labeled and conceived as sociopaths and lunatics, terrorists’ abilities to 
relate to societies’ social and cultural structures breeds success. Similarly, their ability to 
manipulate narrative as it relates to social and cultural traditions is imperative in 
countering military intervention and further spreading terrorism. Terrorist organizations’ 
keen ability to foster commitments from disinterested individuals to a cause influenced 
by pre-modern beliefs such as patriarchy, limited freedoms and self-interests are 
fundamental in shaping social and cultural structures. Al Shabaab and AQIM characterize 
military intervention as forces fervent on reforming cultural and social traditions to 
reflect intervening values.
316
 More importantly, their testament to the value in adopting 
their beliefs in spiritual divinity against an intervening force mitigates a political 




 Often, quantitative studies seek to explain the spread of terrorism, however this 
study draws on literature that suggests a qualitative approach to the unique ability for 
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terrorist groups to manipulate military interventions to successfully spread their 
ideologies. Manipulating military interventions often are strengthened by erroneous 
decisions from intervening forces. Indiscriminate behavior that discredits a native 
society’s beliefs or social values creates a plethora of opportunity for terrorist 
organizations like al Qaeda to rationalize their actions. Perception thus remains vital 
during times of military intervention. The perception of a common threat between an 
intervening force and native population is understood to be a prerequisite for military 
intervention successfully deterring or dissuading the spread of terrorism. Failure to 
acknowledge religious, cultural and social constructs act as a tool of oppression, igniting 
terrorists’ narrative and more importantly, contributing to recruitment strategies. 
Manipulating military intervention that is extensive in a foreign land has become 
pertinent to terrorist organizations that utilize their presence to spread terrorism. The 
unique ability to manipulate message content and narrative enables terrorist organizations 
the opportunity to label intervening forces as the common threat between societies and 
the organization. Enabling an intervened populace to assess what is perceived as in their 
best interest, therefore acts as a determinant in the causal relationship between military 
intervention and the spread of terrorism.  
Social and Cultural reformation is not an intended purpose of military 
intervention seeking to deter or dissuade the spread of terrorism.
318
 This claim by 
Mamdani however, remains an assumption. Commitments to hearts and minds efforts 
often aim at reforming social and cultural structures to some degree. The notion of 
enacting democratic ideals on society as the United States has done over the last decade 
in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest exactly that. The powers of persuasion and force act as a 
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tool for manipulation of narrative.
319
 Force can thus be seen as an overarching tool of 
oppression by intervening forces who would then appear to be at odds with the perception 
of a common threat. Terrorist organizations that utilize persuasion throughout Africa and 
the Middle East are able to elicit a sense of belonging amongst a populace by seeking to 
identify with a social and cultural structure seemingly hampered in countries like 
Somalia, Mali and Libya.  
 Explicit in the ideology expressed by terrorist organizations is the notion of 
eternal reward in the afterlife. This notion is another mechanism of manipulation which 
targets the religious ideologies of a host society. Cultural and social standards under 
terrorist organizations often are grounded on the principles of Sharia Law.  An affiliate of 
AQIM, al Shabaab, has in the past deliberately expressed their wanton belief in adopting 
these structures by claiming ―Glory and eternity to our faithful followers‖
320
. While 
convincing a society to adhere to strict religious frameworks for reasons of moral 
legitimacy and eternal rewards in the afterlife, expelling the structures which essentially 
represent who a society is appears counterproductive.
321
 Manipulating narrative is a tool 
for recruitment and support, however forceful implementation of social and cultural 
traditions is merely parallel to the colonialist characterizations given to military 
interventions from terrorist organizations. Consequently, although manipulating narrative 
is useful in garnering support, forceful implementation of social reform, as seen by al 
Shabaab’s enforcement of Sharia law in Somalia of 2007, remains counterproductive to 
their intent and beneficial to military intervention. Social and cultural traditions create a 
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battleground of moral decisions which can both drive and derail the spread of terrorism. 
Adhering to the values of social and cultural traditions is beneficial, but forceful reform is 
detrimental to their cause. The acceptance of a populace, including their social and 
cultural structures, is a prerequisite for fostering in group commitments.
322
  
 This study is useful in contributing to existing literature by identifying the 
importance of social concepts as a cause and effect on how terrorist organizations use 
military interventions to spread terrorism. It seems evident that the answer is not concrete 
or intuitive, but rather open for interpretation based on perception. It can be perceived 
that military intervention can deter, dissuade and alternatively, supplement the spread of 
terrorism. Likewise, the relationship that terrorist organizations have with the social 
factors at stake determines implications on the spread of terrorism. Regardless of the 
geostrategic origin of an intervening force, the fragility of social, cultural and religious 
implications on military intervention enables a plethora of opportunity for terrorist 
organizations to capitalize on mistakes and disconnects to further their cause. These three 
concepts combined offer a unique qualitative consideration for variables that are 
influential in deterring the intentions of military interventions.   
 
Case Study 
A study of the ways in which terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and AQIM use 
military interventions to further their cause provides a clearer understanding of the 
process by which terrorism spreads. Longevity provides ample opportunity for terrorist 
organizations to manipulate narrative and label an intervening force as reformists of 
Islamic religious beliefs and traditional social and cultural structures. Therefore, 
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understanding how long an intervening power remains in a foreign territory distinguishes 
interventions from occupations which have disparate implications.
323
 Overarching goals 
that seek to occupy territory, reform social structures, or even espouse democratic ideals 
on foreign territory, become measures conducive to terrorist organizations agendas in 
spreading terrorism.
324
 When military interventions loses track of the singular purpose to 
thwart the spread of terrorism, groups like al Qaeda and AQIM gain support by 
discrediting the intentions of the military interventions.   
Utilizing military intervention for purposes of preventing the spread of terrorism 
necessitates a quick and devastating approach for conduct. Interventions of this nature are 
more likely to succeed when they are overwhelmingly destructive against terrorist 
organizations. This approach demonstrates that such an organization cannot benefit 
society and thus reduce its loyalists.
325
 However, in cases like Afghanistan since 2001, 
longevity often creates a liability by which intentions of the intervention evolve into 
overarching goals of political, social and cultural change. Leadership of a terrorist 
organization that can manipulate longevity as at odds with intervener’s stated intentions 
can prove influential. Overwhelming defeat by an intervening force espouses weakness in 
leadership and physical capabilities of terrorist organizations, all of which are detrimental 
to support and recruitment capabilities.
326
 Therefore, survival and attrition against 
intervening forces not only gives hope, but also acts as a significant recruitment tool for 
future combatants.  
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The case study will test two fundamental variables that suggest a likelihood of 
success and extensiveness of an intervention, meaning longevity or brevity. The 
likelihood of an interventions’ success will be tested by looking at efforts taken by an 
intervening force to consider the three regional considerations explored throughout the 
literature review including, religious, social and cultural implications. The length of an 
intervention will show significance to the success of brevity and the liability of longevity. 
First, I will use the Franco-African military intervention against AQIM and its affiliates 
in Mali in January 2012 to demonstrate the inability of AQIM to manipulate the 
intervention’s intention of thwarting the spread of terrorism. This intervention embodies 
both of the suggested variables to be tested with concrete results.  Second, I will use the 
United States intervention in Afghanistan dating from October 2001 to present. This case 
also embodies both variables to be tested and suggest a causal relationship between the 
two variables. The quick and devastating conduct of intervention by Franco-African 
forces demonstrates the inability of AQIM and its affiliates to manipulate narrative and 
conjure ideologies that demonize intervening forces. Essentially, the extensiveness of this 
case has an effect on the likelihood of success. Similarly, this approach limits the ability 
of infringement on critical factors like religious beliefs and social and cultural traditions 
from the intervening force. On the contrary, American led intervention in Afghanistan, 
which has lasted over a decade, is conveyed as an occupation from al Qaeda. As such, al 
Qaeda, AQIM, and its affiliates have portrayed American forces as an occupation of 
―unwelcome invaders, operating outside the rule of law.‖
327
 Longevity has undoubtedly 
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furnished a plethora of opportunities to disrespect religious practices and play into the 
hand of terrorist organizations’ tactics of ideological and narrative manipulation.   
The Franco-African Military Intervention in Mali 
  The Franco-African military intervention against AQIM and its affiliates in 
Northern Mali in January 2012 is representative of a successful approach in preventing 
the spread of terrorism. This intervention sought to be quick in duration and devastating 
in its methods, yet remained sensitive to religious, social and cultural beliefs and 
traditions. Furthermore, the intentions of this intervention were clear. ―French President 
Francois Hollande has made it clear that France has no other interests in Mali other than 
rescuing a friendly state and no other objective than fighting terrorism.‖
328
 The use of 
regional forces strengthened the credibility of the Franco-African intervention as well by 
demonstrating a relationship between intervening forces and the respect of essential 
regional considerations previously discussed. Interventions conducted solely from 
Western states are often liable to manipulation of ideological and regional sensitivities 
that terrorist organizations like AQIM capitalize on. In fact ―interventions can create a 
number of problems for [Western states], including a rise in anti [Western] sentiment, 
diminished credibility of the mission fails, domestic skepticism about future military 
operations…and threats to vital interests where none previously existed‖.
329
 Thus, 
involvement from African nations negated the opportunity for AQIM to manipulate the 
intervention as a Western influenced undertaking to reform Islamic beliefs and cultural 
constructs.  
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The Franco-African military intervention lasted approximately three months from 
January 2013 and major offenses ending in April of 2013. The short duration establishes 
credibility, but more importantly, AQIM was unable to manipulate their stated intentions 
because there was no involvement outside the scope of combating terrorism.  
Intervention ―is likely to generate less opposition when the intervening force makes a 
credible guarantee that it will withdraw and return control to an indigenous government 
in a timely manner‖.
330
 In doing so, they negate any vulnerabilities in their purpose that 
can be used by terrorist organizations to manipulate. Furthermore, respecting religious 
beliefs negates AQIM’s most useful support tool of manipulating religious insensitivities 
to further their cause. Religious implications that most heavily dominate AQIM’s cause 
did not become an issue in this intervention. Moreover, the use of ―rational players‖, 
referring to the regional African forces, establishes a regional concern for threat 
reduction.
331
 Religious beliefs often make it difficult for Western states like France to 
combat ―rebel pursuit issues‖ related to the spread of terrorism. This is due to the 
overwhelming variance religion plays between natives and the interveners involved. ―In 
fact military involvement often aggravates the situation.‖
332
 Sensitivity to religious 
belief and the credibility of a joint military intervention with regional forces have bred 
success. ―The fast moving offensive has led to the loss of territory by the assortment of 
Islamist rebels seeking the creation of an Islamic state‖.
333
 Furthermore, their cache of 
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sophisticated weapons once boasted as their advantage, ―is being decimated through 
aerial bombardment by French forces.‖
334
  Groups like AQIM and its affiliates were 
forced to focus their resources and attention strategically, abandoning their strength in 
religious manipulation as a method to boast their image. The loss of territory and 
strategic limitations created vulnerabilities in AQIM and its affiliates in Northern Mali. 
The quick and devastating approach from Franco-African forces on terrorists groups 
operating throughout the region created a vacuum of power usurpation from these 
organizations.
335
 Furthermore, the inability to demonize Franco-African forces made it 
difficult for AQIM to garner support. Vulnerabilities in power negate convincing 
leadership abilities necessary to establish credibility on a native population.  
The short duration of military intervention in Mali, convincingly established 
credibility in the Franco-African forces intervening throughout the North. Discrediting 
an intervening force’s intentions is often the premise of terrorist organizations ability to 
garner support. The call to religious sentiment as a driving force behind AQIM’s cause 
was severely disabled by the strict adherence to the Franco-African intentions in the 
intervention.  Without relating to religious beliefs, the most important arsenal of 
manipulation decreased the chances of eliciting opposition.  
Sensitivity to Social and Cultural Traditions in Mali 
The effectiveness of sensitivity to social and cultural traditions in Mali by Franco-
African forces made AQIM’s struggle to identify intervening forces as a threat to the 
native society difficult. In their efforts to prevent the spread of terrorism throughout a 
fragmented Northern Mali, the credibility of Franco-African intervention forces 
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significantly derailed recruitment and support capabilities by AQIM and its affiliates on 
the native population. AQIM and its affiliates operating throughout Northern Mali relied 
heavily on support and recruitment within their narrative. Survival or attrition against 
intervening forces strengthened their credibility as suitable alternatives of leadership. 
Consequently, credibility strengthened al Qaeda’s narrative which defines intervening 
forces as indulgers of self-interests.
336
 This approach sought to justify their need in 
society as a new leadership that would serve the interests of Mali and its people. Thus, 
the successes of France’s intentions which sought to ―eradicate terrorism‖
337
 were 
imperative for justifying their reasons for intervention and discrediting the narrative of 
AQIM and its affiliates. Interests that serve the natives of Mali adhered to their social 
needs and discredited an illegitimate attempt of AQIM manipulating military 
interventions as self-interested.  
The Global Terrorism Database provides unique insight into the relationship of 
time period and quantity of terrorist attacks in Mali between 2001 and 2012.
338
 In 
addition to time, the data conveys the ―target type‖ which identifies who groups like al 
Shabaab, AQIM and its affiliates, intend to harm or kill. This relationship enables 
logical assumptions to be drawn based on implications of time periods and intentions to 
explain what has happened to terrorism in the region post Franco-African military 
intervention. Between 2001 and 2011, ―Mali experienced a total of 49 terrorist assaults 
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 The mere significance of this statistic is that one-third of all armed 
assaults during this time period were focused on private citizens and property. Military 
targets accounted for 29 percent of total attacks during this same time period.
340
 By 
contrast, although empirical evidence is thin, after Franco-African military intervention, 
almost all attacks in Mali were carried out against military forces intervening in the 
country
341
. Thus, it is believed that when intervening forces adhere to their intentions 
and do so quickly, it makes it increasingly difficult for terrorist organizations to 
manipulate regional factors like religious beliefs, social and cultural traditions, in an 
effort to demonize intervening forces. Avoiding overarching goals that characteristically 
reflect occupations intrinsically enable success in preventing the spread of terrorism 
through military intervention. This type of approach leaves little room for involvement 
in religious, social, or cultural factors in Mali. The joint effort and devastating method of 
conduct by French and African forces in Mali have established a level of credibility that 
has made it difficult for AQIM to garner support from the natives. Furthermore, 
activating nationalist reaction to their cause has been stymied by the conduct of the 
Franco-African military intervention. 
Nevertheless, if the assumption that the relationship between time period and 
intentions holds false, it is necessary to consider alternatives. Undoubtedly, the militant 
Islamist groups operating throughout Northern Mali have lost valuable territory against 
intervening forces, however we must consider an alternative to what has happened to 
terrorism in the region post Franco-African intervention in Mali. The case in Mali has 
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strategically disabled the spread of terrorism for the time being, but permanent 
implications are still unknown. Al Qaeda and its affiliates like AQIM operating in 
Northern Mali are reliant on the ability of adaptation and statelessness.
342
 Thus, the 
duration and intentions of an intervening force can also be described as a provisional 
explanation of the prevention of terrorism in Mali. Organizations like AQIM and its 
affiliates throughout Mali can be encompassed in a war of attrition against the West, 
waiting for the withdrawal of intervening forces to once again spread their ideology 
through manipulation of religious and social narratives sensitive to the people. 
Intervention of short duration and intentions to eradicate terrorism could ultimately 
evolve into occupations which often reform political structures and leadership in a 
foreign territory. Conclusively, military intervention as a tool to prevent the spread of 
terrorism can arguably be considered a short term application. Al Qaeda and AQIM fully 
understand the disadvantage of resources between them and Western states. Thus, their 
relationship to native societies and ability to manipulate regional factors like religious 
belief, social, and cultural tradition are a means to an end. As such, regional implications 
of military intervention can ultimately be measured over a longer course of time, thus 
negating the immediate effects of military intervention in Northern Mali.  
United States Intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to Today 
 The United States intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to today differs 
significantly from the Franco-African military intervention in Mali. The liability of 
longevity has ultimately created overarching goals on political and social constructs in 
Afghanistan. Moreover, instances of religious insensitivity by American forces have 
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created religious symbolism utilized for recruitment and support by al Qaeda. 
Understanding the Afghanistan case of 2001 and its involvement in comprehending the 
process by which terrorism spreads first compels clarification of the intentions at stake. 
The US-led War in Afghanistan in 2001 ―was not intended or designed to be a stability 
operation. The Taliban regime was removed in order to punish it and to expedite intense, 
large-scale action against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan -- not to stabilize the country…‖
343
 
The intentions of the intervention were supported. ―When the Americans first arrived in 
Afghanistan in 2001, they were not generally perceived as an imperialist power, contrary 
to the British or Soviets. If anything, most Afghans held a positive view of Americans as 
having liberated them from an oppressive regime. Some were also thankful to the US for 
having supported the resistance in the 1980s.‖
344
 Above all, the intentions were viewed 
as legitimate from the native Afghans and ―the overall perception of the United States 
was a positive one‖ toward the end of 2001 and beginning of 2002.
345
 Intentions at this 
point made it difficult for al Qaeda to manipulate their narrative. The longevity of the 
intervention however, became an undermining factor in preventing the spread of 
terrorism.  
Religious Sensitivity 
Religious manipulation has long been the tactic of support and recruitment by al 
Qaeda, most strongly against US forces in Afghanistan. The longevity of the 
intervention in Afghanistan has created the liability of manipulating intervention into 
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occupancy. Bin Laden’s concern with the ―US occupation‖ of the ―Arabian Peninsula‖, 
"the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance‖, and 
the occupation of Jerusalem by the ―Jews‖ are all secular considerations manipulated 
into religious significance.
346
 In an effort to change the military intervention into a 
―crusade occupation‖ Bin Laden analogized the conflict as being "a clear declaration of 
war on God, his messenger, and Muslims."
347
 Although a time table for intervention was 
never established, it was evident that intervention was meant to end the Taliban and al 
Qaeda’s influence and presence in Afghanistan and do so convincingly. An apt and 
devastating approach would thus, be quick in its conduct. Although the Taliban and al 
Qaeda loyalists were toppled in 2001, more than a decade later, the US’s War in 
Afghanistan continues. Al Qaeda fighters continue to join the insurgency in Afghanistan 
against US and coalition forces. Credibility has ultimately been jeopardized by the 
longevity of military intervention. As stated earlier, credibility is the means that 
establishes support from the native population. The intentions of intervening forces that 
were once accepted in late 2001 and early 2002 by Afghans began to lose its legitimacy.  
Sensitivity to Social and Cultural Traditions 
Having already toppled the Taliban and crippled al Qaeda’s abilities, the 
continued presence of intervening forces became suspicious.
348
 Their presence was 
justified as a necessary engagement against the reemergence of Islamist militants, 
however doubts developed.  Restraint among the native population emerged as Afghans 
questioned ―how could the Americans, having displayed awesome power during 
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Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, really be unable to cope with a ragtag 
insurgency?‖
349
 Loss of credibility ultimately increased opposition forces and justified al 
Qaeda’s narrative of intervening forces as a tool of oppression on Islam and the people 
of Afghanistan.
350
 Implications of an assessment from the International Council on 
Security and Development (ICOS) that draws upon regional attitudes of the Afghan 
people are significant in understanding how al Qaeda is able to use the military 
intervention as a tool for support. ―ICOS field research reveals a relationship gap 
between [military intervention] forces and the Afghan communities they are intended to 
protect. 75% of interviewees believe that foreigners disrespect their religion and 
traditions; 74% believe that working with foreign forces is wrong; and 68% believe that 
[military intervention] does not protect them. 55% of interviewees believe that the 
international community is in Afghanistan for its own benefit, to destroy or occupy the 
country, or to destroy Islam.‖
351
  The effects of the longevity in Afghanistan have not 
only strengthened al Qaeda’s narrative, but significantly created doubt in the minds of 




 Perception significantly altered the landscape of military intervention in 
Afghanistan.  As the longevity of the intervention subsisted, increased recruitment and 
support for the global jihad in Afghanistan prospered.
353
 Continued fighting from 
insurgents and al Qaeda affiliates into 2006 ―conveyed the message that they were able 
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to challenge an alliance of the world’s most powerful armies.‖
354
 This was convincing 
narrative in support of al Qaeda, which ultimately complicated the perception of a 
common threat between intervening forces and the native population. The failure of 
expectations inherently jeopardized the legitimacy of the intervention.
355
 In fact, the 
longevity of military intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to today became viewed as 
an occupation. Occupations often provide ample opportunity to interact erroneously with 
regional factors important to native societies like religious beliefs, social and cultural 
traditions. Longevity ultimately enabled the opportunity for error. Erroneous decisions 
by intervening forces like the burning of the Quran and Abu Ghraib cases mentioned 
earlier, create powerful narratives for recruitment and support by terrorist organizations 
like al Qaeda and AQIM. ―Lengthy occupations elicit nationalist reactions that impede 
success.‖
356
 Occupations become a source to justify labeling intervening forces as 
indulgers of self-interest, implications of which play into recruitment and support of al 





With two countries inundated with terrorism and al Qaeda’s influence on society, 
why has one instance of military intervention seemingly succeeded, while the other has 
ostensibly failed? Despite their intentions, each case in Mali and Afghanistan has 
differed in their conduct. The ways in which al Qaeda and AQIM manipulate regional 
factors like religious belief, social and cultural traditions are prominent enough to alter 
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the level of success. Measures of credibility influence support and opposition. 
Furthermore, the perception of a military intervention is contingent upon the success of 
the intentions at stake. Discrediting the military intervention is necessary in furthering 
their cause, however, doing so against an engagement premised on thwarting the spread 
of terrorism is a difficult narrative. Military interventions that seek alternative 
motivational or issue variables other than ―rebel pursuit issues‖ complicate their success 
and create vulnerabilities in preventing the spread of terrorism.
358
  
This chapter holds true to the principles of social science whereby the state of 
social science is to identify insights, while often not identifying clear explanations. 
While this chapter may not fully address how terrorist organizations use military 
interventions to further their cause, it does contribute interesting points of consideration. 
First, the duration of a military intervention provides insight into the liabilities of 
longevity. Despite the intentions, duration can be representative of how intervening 
forces interact with regional factors like religion and culture. Military interventions 
which seek to prevent the spread of terrorism that are short in duration tend to focus 
solely on eliminating the threat and withdrawing, making it difficult for terrorist 
organizations to create a narrative that is sympathetic to their cause. Lengthy 
interventions often unintentionally interact at odds with unique regional factors within a 
native population, ultimately enabling the opportunity of manipulation by al Qaeda and 
AQIM for reasons of support and recruitment. The duration of a military intervention 
can be demonstrative of how terrorism spreads regionally.  
Secondly, the intentions of a military intervention significantly affect essential 
regional factors at stake such as religious belief, social and cultural traditions. Al Qaeda 
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and AQIM rely on capitalizing on errors in intention and overarching goals on native 
societies such as political and social reform. Therefore, credibility determines the 
chances of opposition from the native population or a regional affiliate of al Qaeda 
operating on behalf of the society. Lastly, the reliance on recruitment and support of 
narrative by terrorist organizations like al Qaeda, AQIM and its affiliates, can be 
detrimental to the success in spreading their ideology when military intervention 
establishes legitimate credibility. There seems to be no way to fully avoid the 
phenomenon of combating narratives, however these reasonable conclusions can 
contribute to existing literature of whether military interventions help or hurt terrorist 
organizations. There is no formula whereby intervention can be determined as good 
counterterrorism or bad, however social science has a predictive element. Historically, 
as illustrated throughout the case study, military intervention that is short in duration and 
precise in its targeting is more often than not, successful.  
Let it be clear however, that this chapter is not naïve to the possibility that perhaps 
military intervention is merely a short term or provisional application to preventing the 
spread of terrorism. Perhaps as many opposition to military intervention believe, ―the 
present U.S. policy of foreign interventionism currently fuels the incentive for terrorism 
against it. A policy of military neutrality towards other countries would seem to be the 
greatest step the U.S. government could take to seriously end terrorism‖
359
. 
Nevertheless, at this time, this chapter is effective in its findings to explain the efforts 
terrorist organizations take to promote their ideologies. Furthermore, by studying the 
regional factors of consideration and their role as variables throughout the case study, a 
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greater understanding of how terrorist organizations use military interventions to spread 
their cause can be understood. This chapter adds substantial relevance to the overall 
thesis by representing the psychological consideration through the analysis of 












































 The systematic study of the terrorist decision making process through an 
organizational perspective of tactics and strategies enables this study to draw significant 
conclusions regarding the three most fundamental facets of the decision making process. 
The organizational, strategic and psychological considerations suggests the most 
significant and effective aspects involved in the terrorist decision making process. All 
three considerations account for the most fundamental concerns that are taken into 
account by terrorist organizations. Moreover, this portfolio will contribute to existing 
literature by suggesting that the three fundamental considerations have a symbiotic 
relationship as a result of their effectiveness and relevance to terrorist organizations 
today. This is contrary to existing literature which fails to evaluate the three 
considerations as related. All three considerations offer an explanation of the dynamic 
approach to decisions, thus enabling the opportunity for methodical counterterrorism 
efforts.  
The portfolio offers a meticulous study on this topic by offering a systematic 
approach through first, addressing the organizational consideration, finding that specific 
factors involved in external support enables a terrorist group to exist and sustain their 
operations. Secondly, the portfolio examined the strategic consideration which found that 
specific catastrophic tactics such as suicide terrorism are beneficial in terms of cost 
effectiveness and in terms of broad political goals. Lastly, the examination of 
psychological considerations found that terrorist organizations’ ability to manipulate 
military intervention narratives is dependent upon the way in which intervening forces 
treat essential regional factors including religious beliefs, social and cultural traditions. 
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The three chapters, which are structured respective to these considerations, conclusively 
follow a pattern of devolution from broad tactics and strategies to specific ones. All three 
tied together offer a modern approach to understanding the terrorist decision making 
process in a way that is effective in its implications and relevant to the theatre of war 
today.  
The study of terrorist organizations first, necessitates an examination of what 
enables them to exist and what facilitates their operations. Conclusively, as this study 
showed, external support is the lifeline of an organization; it provides for both direct 
operational needs and broader support activities. Yet, there are three common factors that 
most contribute to the existence and sustainment of a terrorist organization. First, they 
need to operate under a veil of legitimacy. This study showed that the veil challenges 
counterterrorism efforts by diminishing several tactics utilized to cease an organization’s 
operational capabilities and influence. Secondly, external support increases popular 
support of a terrorist organization within a host nation. All terrorist organizations seek 
principle objectives, whether they are political or religious, however the need to garner 
support from host societies remains a calculated decision. Lastly, external support is 
needed to enable an organization to become a formidable threat to its opposition, namely 
the West. This study showed that by understanding terrorist groups within these specific 
common factors counterterrorism efforts can be calculable. 
The study of strategic considerations which identifies suicide terrorism as a 
modus operandi for several terrorist organizations shows a logical and calculated decision 
to employ this tactic. This tactic is methodical in its ability to dramatize carnage and add 
legitimacy to a terrorist group’s claims. Most importantly, suicide terrorism has acted as 
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an equalizer to much more globalized and technologically advanced modern armies. The 
operational advantages justify the motivations behind employing this strategy, yet it also 
provides a shortcoming in that modern literature is brief in the study of alternative means 
of action. Conventional warfare tactics almost appear implicit within the literature by the 
very nature of the militancy involved within a particular terrorist organization. Future 
literature that addresses alternative means of action such as covert action, cyber terrorism, 
or other guerilla warfare tactics would enable an effective comparative analysis of 
specific tactics within the general study of strategic considerations.  
Lastly, the study of psychological considerations identifies the manipulation 
capabilities inherent in many terrorist organizations via ideological influences between 
the group and popular society. Strategies of this degree are utilized to gain support and 
sympathy by activating nationalist reactions. This particular study shows a subtle overlap 
of the three general considerations explored throughout the three chapters, yet this also 
acknowledges a possible shortcoming; that being specificity. Based on the conclusions 
drawn from this chapter, understanding the effects of military intervention on the spread 
of terrorism, remains dependent on many different considerations. Although this chapter 
sought to find an explicit answer to the question at stake, it is perhaps suggested that 
context is significant to this particular study. Identifying whether a terrorist group adheres 
to essential regional considerations or if intervening forces remain sensitive to those 
concerns suggests variability to this topic. Nevertheless, it remains a subjective study 
within the overall framework of tactics and strategies used to explain an essential 
consideration of the terrorist decision making process. It offers the three most influential 
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regional considerations: religious belief, social and cultural traditions; all of which 
necessitate attention for their influence on the success or failure of a military intervention. 
It remains apparent that the organizational, strategic and psychological 
considerations tie together aptly to explain the essence of evaluating the decision making 
process of terrorist organizations. The symbiotic relationship between the three enables 
the opportunity for counterterrorism officials to adopt a systematic approach aimed at 
fractionalizing groups based on their very own methodology of terror. The research 
conducted in this study establishes that the three factors are symbiotic, however further 
research is needed to devise an effective counterterrorism strategy. This study serves as a 
contribution to existing literature which is limited in content related to the terrorist 
decision making process. The decision making process influences the course of terrorist 
campaigns, thus understanding it allows for dynamism to the general study of terrorism. 
Modern literature is inundated with studies on terrorism from the perspective of 
counterterrorism forces; their objectives, needs, successes and failures, however a study 
from the perspective of a terrorist organization allows for assimilation into their 
methodology. This systematic study offers a modern approach to a phenomenon that is 
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